

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A.1. ADDITIONAL FIGURES AND TABLES




FIGURE A1. Distribution of Headquarters Location, Investment Region, and Investment Industry (Respondents Only)

Notes: This figure reports the distribution of headquarters location, investment region, and investment industry for the sample of respondent LPs and GPs. We have 312 LP respondents and 688 GP respondents. We exclude foreign entities from this analysis. Panels A and D show the distribution of headquarters for LPs and GPs, respectively. Panels B and E show the proportion of investment in each region group for LPs and GPs, respectively. In the *Region Group* of Panels A, D, B and E, we map all regions into 6 categories for visualization, *Beijing*, *Shanghai*, *Guangdong*, *Inland Region*, *Coastal Region* and *Foreign Countries*, in which *Coastal Region* indicates that the area belongs to a province adjacent to the sea, while *Inland Region* is the opposite. Panels C and F show the proportion of investment in each industry group for LPs and GPs, respectively.

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


FIGURE A2. Distribution of Headquarters Location, Investment Region, and Investment Industry (Respondents Only; by Government Ownership)

Notes: This figure reports the distribution of headquarters location, investment region, and investment industry for the sample of respondent LPs and GPs, split by government-owned versus nongovernment-owned entities. We have 238 government-owned LP respondents and 74 nongovernment-owned LP respondents. We have 216 government-owned GP respondents and 472 nongovernment-owned GP respondents. We exclude foreign entities from this analysis. Panels A and D show the distribution of headquarters for LPs and GPs, respectively. Panels B and E show the proportion of investment in each region group for LPs and GPs, respectively. In the *Region Group* of Panels A, D, B and E, we map all regions into 6 categories for visualization, *Beijing*, *Shanghai*, *Guangdong*, *Inland Region*, *Coastal Region* and *Foreign Countries*, in which *Coastal Region* indicates that the area belongs to a province adjacent to the sea, while *Inland Region* is the opposite. Panels C and F show the proportion of investment in each industry group for LPs and GPs, respectively. Government-owned entities are defined as entities with government owners.

2019 Chinese Equity Investment Survey

Zero2IPO and Tsinghua University PBC School of Finance are studying how to improve the resource allocation in China's private equity investment market more effectively, establish an efficient and reliable market-based investment system, and better promote technological innovation. The purpose of the survey is to use machine learning technology to introduce general partners (GP) and limited partners (LP), and to help GP and LP form a more effective match by identifying important characteristics of different institutions. We sincerely hope that we could receive strong support and assistance from your organization. Please take the time to fill out the survey questionnaire accurately.

We hope you could evaluate the profiles of hypothetical investment partners. Your choices will be used to provide you with recommendations of and make introductions with actual partners you may be interested in that closely match your preferences. In the survey questionnaire, you will see descriptions of 20 hypothetical partners. Please evaluate each profile based on the following questions:

0) Would you like to meet this investment partner?

1) Are you interested in establishing an investment relationship with this investment partner? (On a scale of 1-10, 1="Not interested"; 10="Extremely interested")

2) How likely do you think it is that this investment partner would want to enter an investment relationship with your organization? (On a scale of 1-10, 1="Not likely"; 10="Extremely likely")

Question 1) seeks to measure your interest in this partner. Assume that the investment partner is already interested in establishing an investment relationship with your organization—therefore please only consider your views on the quality of the investment partner.

Question 2) seeks to measure the likelihood that this partner wants to establish a business relationship with your organization. Assume that you have already expressed interest in the investment partner—therefore please only consider whether you think the partner is interested in establishing an investment relationship with your organization.

* All the data you fill in will be kept strictly confidential, and we will also send you anonymous summary research and related policy reports.

In order to thank your institution for participating, we will provide you with:

- 1) An introduction between the (real) general partner (GP) and the (real) limited partner (LP) to form more effective matches;*
- 2) An early research report from this survey.*



FIGURE A3. 2019 Experimental Survey: Recruitment Email

Notes: This figure shows the recruitment email sent to respondents by Zero2IPO for the 2019 survey. Respondents would read this page before they start the survey and Zero2IPO would guide them with phone calls and in case they have any questions during the whole process.

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


FIGURE A4. Job Positions of Targeted Respondents

Notes: This figure reports the distribution of the primary job position of the targeted individual respondents within their respective GPs and LPs, using the Zero2IPO classification. We have a total of 1,000 individual respondents, of which 312 from LP respondents and 688 from GP respondents. The group of All represents the overall distribution of all respondents. The job positions (discussed in more detail in the paper) are grouped into four types: *Partner*, *Director*, *Manager/Executive*, and *Other*.



 		2021 China Equity Investment Market Research Survey
<p>About this survey</p> <p>Zero2IPO Research Center and PBC School of Finance of Tsinghua University are jointly studying how to more effectively improve the allocation of resources in China's venture capital (VC) and private equity (PE) market, so as to establish an efficient and reliable market-based investment system that can promote technological innovation. Your institution has previously strongly supported and participated in the "2019 China Equity Investment Survey". After rigorous machine-learning analysis, we have helped GPs and LPs form effective matches with each other.</p> <p>A sizable share of investment in the Chinese VC and PE market comes from the government or from enterprises with state-owned equity, which have the purpose of supporting entrepreneurship and technological innovation, especially among young and small to medium sized firms. We would like you to respond to the questions below, based on the general perceptions from the perspective of typical GPs in the market, about government-related LPs (such as government agencies or state-owned firms, or government entities investing in guided funds) and evaluate (1) the advantages of receiving funding from government-related LPs, and (2) how to improve the efficiency in the investment of government-related funding.</p> <p>* After completion, we will summarize the research, and write policy reports and proposals that can inform relevant regulatory authorities to improve the system. All the information you fill in will be kept strictly confidential, and we will also send you anonymous summaries of the research and related policy reports. We sincerely hope that we can continue to receive strong support and assistance from your organization. Please take the time to fill out the survey questionnaire and send it back within the next two weeks.</p>		
<p align="center">1: The advantages of government-related LPs (10=extremely important, 1=not important at all)</p>		<p align="center"><i>Please mark the most important advantage among the 5 options below.</i></p>
1	To speed up regulatory approvals and obtain tax reductions	Please choose: a value between 1-10
2	To obtain larger shares or returns from the government, receive timely funding when facing shortages of private funds in the market, reduce the pressure of fundraising, and obtain follow-up funds more easily	Please choose: a value between 1-10
3	To obtain faster access to reliable information/relevant future policies/industry resources	Please choose: a value between 1-10
4	Government LPs can obtain support from the local government and bring local investment opportunities	Please choose: a value between 1-10
5	To help attract potential investors and follow-up investment from private capital	Please choose: a value between 1-10
Other, please specify:		Please provide comments or suggestions:
<p align="center">2: What can be improved by government-related LPs (10=extremely important, 1=not important at all)</p>		<p align="center"><i>Please mark the most important one among the 5 options below.</i></p>
1	Need less post-investment restrictions on usage of funds in specific regions and industry and on the ratio of investment from private LPs	Please choose: a value between 1-10
2	Need more tolerance of investment risks, and more focus on profit maximization with high-return/high-quality/competitive projects	Please choose: a value between 1-10
3	Need to extend the investment horizon and the requirements on when to exit	Please choose: a value between 1-10
4	Need a more professional team and a more professional approach to make investment decisions so that value can be added post-investment	Please choose: a value between 1-10
5	Need to reduce exposure to policy uncertainty and have more clear investment objectives	Please choose: a value between 1-10
Other, please specify:		Please provide comments or suggestions:

FIGURE A5. 2021 Qualitative Survey

Notes: This figure shows the recruitment email sent to respondents by Zero2IPO for the 2021 survey. Respondents would read this page before they start the surveys and Zero2IPO would guide them with phone calls and in case they have any questions during the whole process.

TABLE A1. Comparing Active and Inactive Entities in the Zero2IPO Database

	Active	Inactive
	All	All
Panel A: LPs		
Share Government-Owned (%)	50.11	NA
Capital Invested (\$ millions)	50.36	20.57
Funds Invested	1.98	1.39
Firm Age	8.29	10.52
Panel B: GPs		
Share Government-Owned (%)	38.63	NA
AUM (\$ millions)	741.30	76.31
IRR (% median)	27.64	21.68
Funds	2.54	2.05
Investments	13.42	2.86
Exits	5.91	0.42
Firm Age	6.95	7.82

Notes: This table reports summary statistics for both LPs and GPs, using Zero2IPO administrative data for the period 2015-19. We have 7,974 active LPs and 6,308 active GPs. We have 16,766 inactive GPs and 6,346 inactive LPs. Inactive entities are defined as entities who have at least one investment activity recorded between 2015 and 2019 but that are not defined as “active” by Zero2IPO. We exclude foreign entities from the analysis. The Panel A includes variables for LPs. The Panel B includes variables for GPs. *Share Government-Owned (%)* is the share of entities that have at least one ultimate owner that is affiliated either with a government agency or a state-owned enterprise, *Capital Invested (\$ millions)* is the amount of capital the LP invested in funds (in Million USD), *Funds Invested* is the number of funds the LP invested in, *AUM (\$ millions)* is the assets under management (in Million USD), *IRR (% median)* is the median internal rate of return, *Funds* is the number of funds managed by the GP, *Investments* is the number of investments made by the GP, *Exits* is the number of exit events for the GP investments. *Firm Age* is the age of the firm as of 2019. *Capital Invested (\$ millions)*, *AUM (\$ millions)* and *IRR (% median)* are winsorized at the top 95%. *Share Government-Owned (%)* is omitted from the inactive sample due to data limitations.

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TABLE A2. Comparing Respondents and Non-Respondents

	Respondents			Non-Respondents		
	All	Gov	NonGov	All	Gov	NonGov
Panel A: LPs						
Share Government-Owned (%)	77.52	100.00	0.00	74.40	100.00	0.00
Capital Invested (\$ millions)	399.59	471.71	207.33	183.82	231.18	51.64
Funds Invested	9.24	10.18	4.45	4.24	4.80	2.53
Firm Age	9.11	8.53	11.13	8.11	8.29	7.60
Panel B: GPs						
Share Government-Owned (%)	32.05	100.00	0.00	34.86	100.00	0.00
AUM (\$ millions)	1001.76	1491.48	691.78	595.97	618.98	592.73
IRR (% median)	32.34	25.78	36.57	25.76	18.67	30.12
Funds	3.32	4.22	2.81	2.64	2.93	2.45
Investments	48.40	44.36	50.35	13.26	12.42	13.70
Exits	9.36	11.86	8.06	4.34	5.08	3.96
Firm Age	7.13	7.54	6.94	6.37	6.75	6.17

Notes: This table reports summary statistics for both LPs and GPs, using Zero2IPO administrative data for the period 2015–19. We have 312 respondent LPs and 688 respondent GPs. We have 478 non-respondent LPs and 912 non-respondent GPs. We exclude foreign entities from this analysis. The Panel A includes variables for LPs. The Panel B includes variables for GPs. *Share Government-Owned (%)* is the share of entities that have at least one ultimate owner that is affiliated either with a government agency or a state-owned enterprise, *Capital Invested (\$ millions)* is the amount of capital the LP invested in funds (in Million USD), *Funds Invested* is the number of funds the LP invested in, *AUM (\$ millions)* is the assets under management (in Million USD), *IRR (% median)* is the median internal rate of return, *Funds* is the number of funds managed by the GP, *Investments* is the number of investments made by the GP, *Exits* is the number of exit events for the GP investments. *Firm Age* is the age of the firm as of 2019. *Capital Invested (\$ millions)*, *AUM (\$ millions)* and *IRR (% median)* are winsorized at the top 95%.

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TABLE A3. Government-Owned GPs Perform Worse (Respondents Only)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	CR	CR	CR	CR	IRR	IRR	IRR	IRR
Gov GPs	-0.015*** (-2.89)	-0.014*** (-2.79)	-0.017*** (-2.94)	-0.017*** (-2.82)	-17.456*** (-2.62)	-15.238** (-2.22)	-23.958*** (-3.15)	-20.504*** (-2.66)
AUM			-0.000* (-1.70)	-0.000* (-1.78)			-0.002 (-1.52)	-0.003** (-2.18)
Observations	410	410	336	336	388	388	319	319
HQ FEs	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: This table illustrates the association between GPs' government ownership status and GP performance, within the sample of respondents. The specification is $y_j = \alpha_i + \beta \times GovGPs_j + \gamma \times AUM_j + \epsilon_{ij}$. The sample includes all active GPs with non-missing data for CR (columns 1-4) and IRR (columns 5-8). *GovGPs* is a dummy indicating whether a GP is government owned. CR is comprehensive return, which is standardized to 0-1. IRR is winsorized at the 95% percentile. *AUM* is the total asset under management in USD millions, and is winsorized at the 95% percentile. Columns 1 and 5 show the basic models. Columns 2 and 6 show the results with headquarters FEs. Columns 3 and 7 show the results with *AUM* as controls. Columns 4 and 8 show the results with both headquarters FEs and *AUM* controls. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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TABLE A4. Assortative Matching Between Government-Owned GPs and LPs (Respondents Only)

	Gov LP	Non-Gov LP	ColRatio
Gov GP	1.724 (31.25 %)	0.915 (16.39 %)	1.884 (0.000)
Non-Gov GP	0.706 (22.73 %)	0.932 (29.64 %)	0.757 (0.000)
RowRatio	2.442 (0.000)	0.982 (0.764)	
Assortative Index		1.220	
Homogeneity Test(p-value)		0.000	

Notes: This table presents the distribution of links between different GPs and LPs grouped by government ownership, illustrating assortative matching patterns, within the sample of respondents. The likelihood ratio index is calculated as $s(p^{GP}, p^{LP}) = \frac{Pr(G^{GP}=p^{GP}, G^{LP}=p^{LP})}{Pr(G^{GP}=p^{GP})Pr(G^{LP}=p^{LP})}$. We define $Pr(G^{GP} = p)$ as the ratio of type p GP among all GPs with at least one link, e.g., if p is government owned, then the probability is the ratio of government owned GPs among GPs with at least one link. $Pr(G^{GP} = G^{LP} = p)$ is defined as the ratio of links where GP and LP both belong to group p among all links in the sample. The number in the parentheses is the fraction of links among all links formed between GP and LP with ownership information. Assortative index is calculated as the weighted average of the diagonal elements. ColRatio is calculated as column 1 divided by column 2 in the same row. RowRatio is calculated as row 1 divided by row 2 in the same column. The numbers in the parentheses under the ColRatios and RowRatios are the p-values of the binomial test within the corresponding rows and columns respectively, under the null hypothesis of random matching. The p-value of the homogeneity test is a Chi-square test. Government GPs and government LPs are defined as entities that have at least one ultimate government owner, as described in the paper.

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TABLE A5. LP Type Distribution

LP Types (in %)	Active			Respondent		
	All	Gov	NonGov	All	Gov	NonGov
Assets Management Company	4.63	5.18	3.41	1.83	1.94	1.65
Bank and Insurance Company	2.14	2.88	0.49	0.88	1.45	0.00
Corporate	14.77	11.35	22.41	0.02	0.02	0.02
FOFs	3.31	4.38	0.93	0.82	0.92	0.66
Government Bureau and Guided Fund	10.91	15.80	0.00	8.26	13.59	0.00
Investment Company	3.90	2.68	6.63	0.15	0.23	0.03
Listed Company	8.05	7.57	9.13	8.82	5.74	13.57
Others	1.32	1.36	1.24	0.03	0.04	0.00
Sovereign Fund	0.56	0.81	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Trust	0.70	0.94	0.16	0.00	0.00	0.00
VC/PE	49.70	47.06	55.59	79.20	76.06	84.06

Notes: This table reports the distribution of type for LPs, using Zero2IPO administrative data for the period 2015–19. We have 7,974 active LPs of which 312 LPs are respondents. The distribution is weighted according to the total investment amount of each type of LP during 2015–2019. The classification standard comes from Zero2IPO’s administrative data, where *VC/PE* refers to venture capital and private equity firms that specialize in early stage and growth equity investments, and the *Others* includes Family Office, University Fund and other unclassified entities. Government-owned entities are those with at least one ultimate government owner, as described in the paper.

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TABLE A6. Summary Statistics by Government Level

	Active			Respondent		
	All	Gov	NonGov	All	Gov	NonGov
Panel A: LPs						
Share Government-Owned (%)	50.11	100.00	0.00	77.52	100.00	0.00
Share Central-Owned (%)	24.23	49.95	0.00	32.55	42.36	0.00
Share Provincial-Owned (%)	23.52	48.47	0.00	45.30	58.95	0.00
Share Local-Owned (%)	37.51	77.31	0.00	55.03	71.62	0.00
Panel B: GPs						
Share Government-Owned (%)	38.63	100.00	0.00	32.05	100.00	0.00
Share Central-Owned (%)	21.70	59.95	0.00	19.42	64.80	0.00
Share Provincial-Owned (%)	20.86	57.62	0.00	20.03	66.84	0.00
Share Local-Owned (%)	25.31	69.93	0.00	21.87	72.96	0.00

Notes: This table summarizes different government ownership types for both LPs and GPs. We have 7,974 active LPs of which 312 LPs are respondents, and 6,308 active GPs of which 688 GPs are respondents. We exclude foreign entities from this analysis. *Share Government-Owned* indicates the proportion of government-owned entities. *Share Central-Owned* indicates the proportion of entities owned by central government agencies. *Share Provincial-Owned* indicates the proportion of entities owned by provincial government agencies. *Share Local-Owned* indicates the proportion of entities owned by local government agencies.

TABLE A7. Variables in Synthetic LP Profiles

Variables	Description
Government Ties	A dummy indicating whether the LP has ties to the government.
Large Investor	A dummy indicating whether the LP has size above 1 billion yuan.
High Registered Capital	A dummy indicating whether the registered capital of the LP is > 1 billion yuan.
Industry Information	A dummy indicating whether the LP profile displays industry information.
Young LP	A dummy indicating whether the LP is a young LP (founded after 2010).
Headquarter in Foreign Country	A dummy indicating whether the LP is headquartered in a foreign country.
Headquarter in Beijing	A dummy indicating whether the LP is located in Beijing.
Corporate Governance	A dummy indicating whether the LP profile displays description of corporate governance.
Investment Philosophy	A dummy indicating whether the LP profile displays description of investment philosophy.
Stage Focus	A dummy indicating whether the LP profile displays the targeted stage of investments.

Notes: This table illustrates the coding of regressors based on original profile components. The first column shows the main regressors. The second column gives a brief description of the variables. See Table A8 for details on all profile components.

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TABLE A8. Description of LP Profiles Randomized Components

Variable	Categorical Value	Options			
Government Ties (0.8)	Government Ties: 1 if with government ties [5-11].	1 This company aims to give full play to the role of the market in allocating resources and expand private capital investments in innovation and entrepreneurship, so as to promote the development of emerging industries. 公司目标是充分发挥市场资源配置和扩大社会资本投资创新创业的作用,以促进新兴产业发展。	2 With the help of the private capital market and modern management practices, this organization channels capital to sectors of strategic importance and beneficial to social development. 公司依托资本市场,运用现代管理战略,吸引各类社会资金投资具有战略意义和促进社会发展的领域。	3 This organization is one of the earliest market-oriented financing platforms in China. The management team is committed to increasing investors' asset value, using modern management methods to protect investors' rights. 公司是最早的以市场为导向的投资融资平台之一,管理者运用现代管理方式维护投资者权力,致力于为投资者资本保值增值。	4 This organization channels capital to independent innovative enterprises nationwide. It aims to better promote technological innovation through its professional business model and its efficient and reliable market-oriented investment system. 机构面向全国自主创新企业,并为其提供资金支持,通过专业的经营模式,高效可靠的市场化投资体系,更好地推动科技创新。
		5 It is a platform for the central government to hold shares of large enterprises and supervise SOEs, thus supporting the restructuring of SOEs and the adjustment of industrial structure. 中央政府通过持股大型企业来直接监督国有企业,为国有企业的改制和产业结构调整搭建平台。	6 This organization is established by the CCP provincial committee and the provincial government. It accelerates economic transformation mainly through supporting the development of venture capitals and attracting social capital into venture capitals. 经省委、省政府批准而设立的投资机构,主要支持风险投资企业的发展,引导社会资金进入风险投资领域,加快转型。	7 It is an investment organization established by a state-owned firm funded by the provincial government. It mainly focuses on investment, financing, and asset management. 经省人民政府资助的国有独资公司批准而设立的投资机构,主要从事投资、融资和资产管理。	8 It is funded by the provincial government. It aims to attract social capital investment into enterprises. 得到省政府财政资金的支持,目的是吸引社会资本投资到企业。
		9 The provincial government established this organization and guides its capital operation, equity investment and asset management. 由省政府批准成立设立,指导资本运作、股权投资和资产管理。	10 Its establishment and operation is approved by the local government. Its main businesses include the investment, operation, and management of state-owned assets. 经当地政府批准,主营业务包括国有资产的投资,经营和管理。	11 Funded and managed by the local government, it operates in a market-oriented manner. 由当地政府出资和运作,并以市场化的方式进行运作。	
Fund Size and Management (0.8)	Large Investor: 1 if fund size >1 billion [7-12].	1 The amount under management is 200 Million yuan allocated to a total of 12 funds, with investments in more than 12 startups, including 5 of them that are listed in domestic and foreign capital markets. 管理基金投资项目2亿多元,拥有基金12支,已投资12家创业公司,其中5家在国内外资本市场上市。	2 It established 20 RMB funds with a total size of 600 Million yuan. 管理20支人民币基金,总资金管理规模达到6亿元。	3 The total size of the funds it provided capital to reached 700 Million yuan, with 15 RMB funds in total. The capital went to 20 startups, 8 of which are now listed companies. 管理总规模达到7亿元,设立15支投资基金,已投资接近20家创业公司,通过股权投资平台,成功培育了8家上市公司。	4 A total of 21 funds were set up, which led to about 650 Million yuan of social funds. 设立风险投资基金21支,带动社会资金约6.5亿元。
		5 It established more than 25 funds, with a total committed capital of over 750 Million yuan and more than 20 accumulated investment projects. 已参与设立25多支基金,总管理资金超过7.5亿元,累计投资项目超过20个。	6 As of end of 2018, it managed a capital of 800 Million yuan, with 23 completed investment projects, and 9 listed companies that have been fostered by the investment platform. 截至2018年,已管理8亿元资金,完成投资项目23个,通过投资平台,培育了9家上市公司。	7 The assets under management are over 1.5 Billion yuan, with investments in 25 projects, and a total amount invested of 900 million yuan. 管理资产超过15亿元,完成投资项目25个,总投资为9亿元。	8 As of December 2018, it established 8 direct investment platforms, and had committed capital of 2.5 Billion yuan, with investments in over 25 enterprises. 截至2018年12月,共有8个直接投资平台,管理资金达到25亿元,累计投资企业超过25家。
		9 By the end of March 2018, it invested in 15 funds, for a total of 2.5 Billion yuan, and overall available assets of 4.5 billion yuan. 截至2018年3月底,已投资15支基金,总规模达25亿,总资产为45亿元。	10 As of June 2018, it contributed to 22 funds for a total size of 6 Billion yuan. 截至2018年6月,公司共设立22支基金,总资金规模达到60亿元。	11 By the end of 2018, the company invested in 30 funds, including industrial investment funds and platform investment funds. 截至2018年底,公司管理了近30支基金,包括产业投资基金和平台投资基金。	12 The target scale of the fund to invest in is 15 Billion RMB, and in the past it invested in 30 funds, and 45 innovative small and medium-sized enterprises, effectively playing the exemplary role of guiding the funds to promote innovation and entrepreneurship. 基金目标规模为150亿人民币,共设立了30家创业投资基金,已投资45家创新型中小企业,有效发挥了推动创新创业的示范作用。
Registered Capital (1)	High Registered Capital: 1 if >1 Billion [5-9].	1 The institution has a registered capital of 100 million yuan, 公司的注册资本为1亿元人民币。	2 The financing platform has initial total assets of 500 million RMB, 融资平台的初始资本为5亿元人民币。	3 The investment institution has a total registered capital of RMB 1 billion, 投资公司的注册资本是10亿元人民币。	4 The registered capital of the government-guided fund reaches RMB 1 billion, 引导基金的注册资本是10亿元人民币。
		5 The guided fund has a registered capital of 3 billion yuan, 引导基金资本的注册为30亿元人民币。	6 The investment institution has a registered capital of 3 billion yuan, 投资机构的注册资本为30亿元人民币。	7 The investment institution has a registered capital of RMB 5 billion, 风险投资的注册资本为50亿元人民币。	8 The guided fund has a registered capital of RMB 5 billion, 政府引导基金的注册资本为50亿元人民币。
		9 The government guided fund, which provides strong support to advanced industries, has a registered capital of RMB 8 billion, 一家为促进先进产业发展而设立的政府引导基金,注册资本为80亿元人民币。			

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Table A8 (cont.): Description of LP Profiles Randomized Components

Variable	Categorical Value	Options			
Industry (0.5)	Industry: 1 if show industry information [1-21].	1 It focuses on the Internet industry and provides financing service for enterprises in the industry. 重点投向互联网行业, 并为企业提供金融服务。	2 In the past, the institution has successfully funded several investments in Social Network and Media. 已投资项目聚集在社交网络和媒体行业。	3 The institution targets investments in information technology and related sectors such as Blockchain, Big Data, Artificial Intelligence, Robot, or Human Face Recognition. 重点投向区块链、大数据、人工智能、机器人或人脸识别等信息技术相关的高科技领域。	4 The firm seeks to invest in Bio and Healthcare industries and actively seeks equity investments or strategic buyouts. 致力于投资生物和医疗保健领域, 并积极寻求股权投资和战略性收购。
		5 The primary industries of past investments include high-tech, high growth companies in clean technology, healthcare, and advanced manufacturing sectors. 优先投资领域为清洁技术、医疗保健、先进制造业。	6 The investment scope includes advanced manufacturing, modern agriculture, and the maritime economy. 重点投资领域包括先进制造业、现代农业和海洋经济。	7 The main direction of the company's investments is infrastructure investment and the development of electric power, gas, water production and supply, railway transportation and other industries. 主要投资方向是基础设施投资和电力、天然气、水生产和供应、铁路运输和其他行业。	8 Over the past years, the investment focus has been on new opportunities in the wealth management industry. 一直以来, 机构专注财富管理行业的新发展环境和机遇。
		9 Core businesses include venture capital broadly, and sectors related to fund management, assets management, project assessment, and financial advisory in finance. 公司核心业务包括风险投资、基金管理、资产管理、项目评估和金融行业财务咨询服务。	10 The institution prefers investments in fast-moving consumer products (Food and Beverages) and the broader services industry. 机构主要投资于快速消费品 (食品和饮料) 和服务业。	11 The investments currently focus on education and training. 公司目前的投资重点是教育和培训。	12 The focus is on strategic emerging industries such as biotech, internet, new energy, new materials, new generation of information technology, cultural creativity, energy conservation, and environmental protection. 专注于生物、互联网、新能源、新材料、新一代信息技术、文化创意、节能环保等战略性新兴产业。
		13 The institution focuses on investments in Aerospace related industries, as well as industries such as life and health, ocean, military industry, robots, wearable, and intelligent equipment. 致力于对航空航天相关行业的投资, 同时投向大健康、海洋、军事工业、机器人、可穿戴设备和智能设备等行业。	14 The institution seeks opportunities in information technology, energy conservation and environmental protection, new energy, new materials, biotechnology, high-end equipment manufacturing and other national strategic emerging industries. 在信息技术、节能环保、新能源、新材料、生物技术、高端装备制造等国家战略性新兴产业投资。	15 The incubation and investment in the transformation of scientific and technological achievements includes information technology, life sciences and Biological Medicine. 投资科技成果转化孵化, 包括信息技术、生命科学和生物医学。	16 The institution is equipped with specialized investment teams that produced successful exits in various industries, such as agriculture, chemical engineering, energy, pharmaceuticals, healthcare, and information technology. 机构拥有专业的团队, 在农业、化学工程、能源、制药、医疗保健、信息技术等行业创造大量成功案例。
		17 The fund pays important attention to intelligence-sensitive services, advanced manufacturing, environment protection, and energy saving industries. 重点投向先进制造业、环保和节能产业。	18 The investment areas are very extensive, and include software and hardware companies, production companies and technology service companies, including home and business mobile communications. 投资领域非常广泛, 包括软件和硬件公司、生产公司和技术服务公司, 涵盖家庭和企业移动通信。	19 It regularly invests in satellite applications, information technology, new materials and new energy, aerospace special technologies, automation and special vehicles and other fields. 一直以来投资于航空航天、卫星应用、信息技术、新材料和新能源、航空航天特殊技术应用、汽车零部件和特种车辆等领域。	20 To promote local high-tech industry, the institution focuses on new materials, new equipment, new energy, new communication technologies, marine tech, energy conservation and environmental protection, and life and health. 重点投向新材料、新设备、新能源、新一代通信技术、海洋高科技、节能环保、生命健康等领域, 促进当地高新技术产业发展。
		21 The portfolio covers a broad spectrum of industries: financial services, telecommunications, media technology, energy resources, and life sciences. 投资项目涉及广泛的行业, 金融服务、电信、媒体技术、能源和生命科学。			
		Founding Year (0.8)	Young LP: 1 if founded after 2010 [5-9].	1 founded in June 2000, 2000年成立。	2 formally established in 2002, 2002年成立。
5 founded in December 2010, 2010年12月成立。	6 established in 2011, 2011年成立。			7 founded in 2012, 2012年成立。	8 established in 2015, 2015年成立。
9 was recently established in 2016, 2016年新成立。					

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Table A8 (cont.): Description of LP Profiles Randomized Components

Variable	Categorical Value	Options			
Location of HQ (1)	Headquarter in Foreign Country: 1 if headquarter in Foreign Country [13,14]. Headquarter in Beijing: 1 if headquarter in Beijing [15,16].	1	2	3	4
		located in Jiangsu Province. 位于江苏省。	set up in the Guizhou Province. 设立于贵州省。	headquartered in Shanghai. 总部位于上海市。	mainly invests in Shanghai and Yangtze River Delta. 投资主要覆盖上海和长三角地区。
		5	6	7	8
		located in Guangdong to promote the development of the Greater Bay area. 位于广东，致力于推动大湾区发展。	investment headquartered in Guangzhou. 投资总部设在广州。	located in the Shenzhen-Hong Kong Business Cooperation Zone. 地点位于深港业务合作区。	set up 10 business centers in 8 cities including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Chongqing. 在北京、上海、广州、深圳、重庆等8个城市分别设立了10个业务中心。
		9	10	11	12
		has 15 branches in 10 regions across the whole China. 在中国内地10个地区设有15家分支机构。	which invests all provinces and cities across the country. 投资项目覆盖全国各省市。	established in Fujian Province as one of the most important investment platforms. 是福建省重要的投资平台之一。	an influential investment institution in Shandong Province. 是目前山东省具有影响力的投资机构。
13	14	15	16		
headquartered in the Silicon Valley. 总部位于硅谷。	based in Singapore and concentrated on Asia and growth markets. 位于新加坡，主要关注亚洲和新兴市场。	located in Beijing. 位于北京。	headquartered in Beijing, it has offices in Europe and North America. 总部位于北京，在欧洲和北美设有分支机构。		
Investment Philosophy (0.63)	Investment Philosophy: 1 if investment philosophy is included [1-10].	1	2	3	4
		Its investment philosophy is to promote new industrialization through science and technological development. It also takes advantage of the amplifying effect of financial leverage and enforces professional management. 投资理念是依靠科学技术的发展和高新技术的开发，推动新型工业化，发挥杠杆放大效应，实施专业化管理。	To attract to the local area high-quality venture capital firms, projects, technologies, and talents, it focuses on cultivating strategic and emerging industries. 投资专注于培育战略和新兴产业，以吸引高质量的风险投资、项目、技术和人才到当地。	It aims to enhance independent innovation ability through attracting venture capital investment into SMEs, especially science and technology SMEs, and taking advantage of the amplifying effect of financial leverage. 为了发挥资金的杠杆放大效应，吸引风险投资公司对中小企业的投资，特别是科技型企业，以提高自主创新能力。	It aims to enrich the structure of financial products through technological and management innovation, thus enlarging the space for economic development and social reform. 经营宗旨是：不断推进技术和管理创新，丰富金融产品结构，为经济和社会改革提供更广阔的空间。
		5	6	7	8
It aims to promote the development of the venture capital market, thus accelerating the improvements of financing environment and economic structure. 发展目标促进风险投资环境的发展，推进融资环境和经济结构调整。	Accelerating the improvement of industrial structure through the integration of high-quality social resources is its investment objective. 投资坚持“集合优质社会资源，促进产业化”的宗旨。	Its long-term goal is to promote the development of high-tech industries in China through providing value-added services related to venture capital investment, thus nurturing strategic industries and promoting the economic transformation. 长期目标是通过提供风险投资相关的增值服务，促进中国高科技产业的发展，培育战略性新兴产业，实现经济转型的目标。	It aims to attract social capital to follow its investment, including prestigious venture capital institutions from both within and outside the local province. 引导基金吸引社会资本的范围包括省内外的一流风险投资公司。		
9	10				
It implements a management system that separates management decision-making from the government; Its operation principles are “government guidance, market operation, amplification through leverage, and risk prevention”. 机构实行管理决策与政府分离的管理体制，按照“政府引导，市场运作，杠杆放大和风险防范”的原则运作。	As a long-term investor, it has the investment philosophy of achieving the targeted return rate while keeping the risks low. 作为长期投资者，投资理念是在实现回报目标同时控制风险。				

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Table A8 (cont.): Description of LP Profiles Randomized Components

Variable	Categorical Value	Options			
Corporate Governance (0.5)	Corporate Governance: 1 if corporate governance [1-7].	1 The organization adopts a rigorous auditing and compliance system on par with international standards to better serve the interests of investors. 公司引入严格的审计和合规体系, 以更好地服务于投资人的利益。	2 This firm implements strict risk management with modern corporate governance practices; it closely follows the core values of “integrity, professionalization, standardization, and innovation”. 公司坚持“诚信、专业、规范、创新”的核心价值观, 依靠现代化的公司治理, 严格的实施风险控制和他理。	3 With a professional team and an open cultural atmosphere, this firm offers comprehensive and professional financial services to the clients, and is committed to becoming the most reliable, the most sustainable, and the most advanced firm in the industry. 依靠专业的员工团队, 开放的文化氛围, 为投资者提供全面和专业的金融服务, 致力于成为行业“最可靠、最可持续的和最领先的公司”。	4 With the goal of accelerating industrial advancement and social development, this firm has the following codes of conduct: professionalization, innovation, rigor, and efficiency. 公司坚持专业、创新、严谨、高效的准则, 以促进产业进步和社会发展发挥积极作用。
		5 Bringing long-term returns at an acceptable level of risk is its long-standing investment philosophy. 长期以来的投资理念是在可接受的风险水平下带来长期回报。	6 To help start-ups establish a leading position in their industries, this firm established a standard and rigorous investment and risk management system, introduced advanced management philosophy and professional methods, and built an experienced and high-quality investment team. 建立规范、严谨的投资管理体系和风险控制体系, 引入先进管理理念和专业管理手段, 培育了一支经验丰富、高素质的投资团队, 确立创业型企业的领先地位。	7 This firm operates, invests, manages, and withdraws in a market-oriented way. 以市场导向的方式运作、投资、管理和撤回。	
Stage Focus (0.5)	Stage Focus: 1 if show stage focus [1-3]	1 The purpose is to channel capital to angel projects to help finance early stage enterprises. 集中投资企业的早期天使项目, 并发挥对资本的撬动作用。	2 It frequently provides financing for investments in the growth and expansion stage, but it also invests selectively in early and late stage projects. 一直以来为企业的扩张阶段提供融资, 同时投资早期和晚期的项目。	3 The investments target late stage projects which can facilitate the IPO of innovative companies. 投资着重于后期阶段, 以帮助创新企业实现上市目标。	

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TABLE A9. Years of Experience in the Firm of Targeted Respondents

	N	Mean	SD	p10	p25	Median	p75	p90
Panel A: All								
All	513	9.87	5.99	4	6	9	12	18
Partner	175	11.59	6.54	5	7	10	15	20
Director	80	9.44	6.09	3	5	8	12	19
Manager/Executive	216	9.20	5.56	4	5	8	11	17
Other	42	6.93	3.06	3	5	6.5	9	11
Panel B: GPs								
All	344	9.58	5.40	4	6	9	11.5	16
Partner	142	10.96	6.29	5	7	9	14	20
Director	33	9.61	5.28	4	6	9	11	14
Manager/Executive	143	8.88	4.39	4	6	8	11	13
Other	26	5.92	2.02	3	5	6	7	9
Panel C: LPs								
All	169	10.45	7.04	3	5	9	14	20
Partner	33	14.33	7.00	6	9	15	19	21
Director	47	9.32	6.66	2	4	8	13	20
Manager/Executive	73	9.84	7.32	2	5	8	12	21
Other	16	8.56	3.76	3	6	9	11.5	14

Notes: This table reports summary statistics of year of experience in the respondent firm, for both GP and LP respondents. We have a total of 1,000 individual respondents, of which 688 are GP respondents and 312 are LP respondents. We categorize positions into four types: Partner, Director, Manager/Executive, and Other. *Partner* indicates a certain kind of partner. *Director* indicates members of the board of directors. *Manager/Executive* indicates a senior executive or department head/manager of an entity. *Other* indicates positions other than those mentioned above. We report the group-level mean, standard deviation, 10% percentile, 25% percentile, median, 75% percentile and 90% percentile. N indicates the number of non-missing values for each group.

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TABLE A10. GP Preferences for LPs: Expected Interest

	Expected Interest	
	(1)	(2)
Government Ties	-0.077** (-2.00)	-0.051 (-1.39)
Large Investor	0.133*** (3.84)	0.140*** (4.22)
High Registered Capital	0.227*** (6.45)	0.224*** (6.64)
Industry Information	-0.240*** (-6.99)	-0.181*** (-5.52)
Young LP	0.014 (0.41)	0.032 (0.95)
Headquarter In Foreign Country	0.044 (0.71)	-0.017 (-0.27)
Headquarter In Beijing	0.270*** (5.32)	0.244*** (4.95)
Corporate Governance	0.003 (0.09)	0.050 (1.52)
Investment Philosophy	0.006 (0.16)	0.046 (1.35)
Stage Focus	-0.105*** (-3.02)	-0.091*** (-2.74)
Observations	13363	13363
Unique GPs	679	679
GP FEs	No	Yes
Model	OLS	OLS
DV Mean	6.425	6.425
DV SD	1.999	1.999

Notes: This table shows how GP response to “Expected Interest” from potential LPs vary with LP profile characteristics. The specification is $y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \beta \times GovernmentTies_j + \sum_{m=1}^N \gamma_m \times Characteristic_{jm} + \epsilon_{ij}$. The sample includes all GP respondents participating in the experiments who gave at least one valid answer to each question. *GovernmentTies* is a dummy indicating whether the LP profile displays a link to the government. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Table A7. Expected Interest is on a scale of 1-10. Column 1 shows the baseline OLS. Column 2 shows the regression adding GP respondents fixed effects. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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TABLE A11. GP Preferences for LPs (Ordered Probit)

	Partner Rating	
	(1)	(2)
Government Ties	-0.055*** (-2.79)	-0.041** (-2.03)
Large Investor	0.069*** (3.88)	0.088*** (4.78)
High Registered Capital	0.099*** (5.52)	0.106*** (5.75)
Industry Information	-0.102*** (-5.76)	-0.085*** (-4.67)
Young LP	0.000 (0.01)	-0.006 (-0.34)
Headquarter In Foreign Country	0.013 (0.40)	-0.021 (-0.63)
Headquarter In Beijing	0.100*** (3.72)	0.094*** (3.35)
Corporate Governance	0.009 (0.50)	0.032* (1.77)
Investment Philosophy	0.008 (0.43)	0.018 (0.97)
Stage Focus	-0.038** (-2.15)	-0.045** (-2.42)
Observations	13375	13375
Unique GPs	679	679
GP FEs	No	Yes
Model	OLS	OLS
DV Mean	6.448	6.448
DV SD	2.016	2.016

Notes: This table shows GP preferences for LP synthetic characteristics with an ordered probit model. Ordered probit cutpoints (column 1): -1.87, -1.57, -1.36, -1.18, -0.47, -0.03, 0.41, 0.96, 2.33. Ordered probit cutpoints (column 2): -2.60, -2.25, -1.99, -1.79, -0.97, -0.49, -0.02, 0.58, 2.17. The sample includes all GP respondents participating in the experiments who gave at least one valid answer to each question. *GovernmentTies* is a dummy indicating whether the LP profile displays a link to the government. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Table A7. Partner Rating is on a scale of 1-10. Column 1 shows the basic models. Column 2 shows regressions adding GP respondents fixed effects. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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TABLE A12. GP Preferences for LPs: Cooperation Interest

	Cooperation Interest	
	(1)	(2)
Government Ties	-0.021*** (-3.05)	-0.014** (-2.23)
Large Investor	0.036*** (5.88)	0.039*** (7.22)
High Registered Capital	0.047*** (7.51)	0.047*** (8.34)
Industry Information	-0.055*** (-9.13)	-0.042*** (-7.79)
Young LP	-0.002 (-0.38)	0.001 (0.22)
Headquarter In Foreign Country	0.009 (0.78)	0.006 (0.53)
Headquarter In Beijing	0.046*** (5.46)	0.043*** (5.56)
Corporate Governance	0.002 (0.25)	0.011** (2.11)
Investment Philosophy	-0.007 (-1.16)	0.003 (0.54)
Stage Focus	-0.032*** (-5.19)	-0.030*** (-5.40)
Observations	13499	13499
Unique GPs	679	679
GP FEs	No	Yes
Model	OLS	OLS
DV Mean	0.852	0.852
DV SD	0.355	0.355

Notes: This table shows GP preferences for LP synthetic characteristics, using the dummy Cooperation Interest as dependent variable. The specification is $y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \beta \times GovernmentTies_j + \sum_{m=1}^N \gamma_m \times Characteristic_{jm} + \epsilon_{ij}$. The sample includes all GP respondents participating in the experiments who gave at least one valid answer to each question. *GovernmentTies* is a dummy indicating whether the LP profile displays a link to the government. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Table A7. Column 1 shows the basic models. Column 2 shows regressions adding GP respondents fixed effects. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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TABLE A13. GP Preferences for LPs: Clustering SEs at Respondent Level

	Partner Rating	
	(1)	(2)
Government Ties	-0.114*** (-2.79)	-0.079** (-1.99)
Large Investor	0.147*** (4.28)	0.167*** (4.91)
High Registered Capital	0.196*** (5.50)	0.185*** (5.23)
Industry Information	-0.231*** (-6.54)	-0.178*** (-5.09)
Young LP	-0.004 (-0.12)	-0.010 (-0.28)
Headquarter In Foreign Country	0.034 (0.52)	-0.022 (-0.32)
Headquarter In Beijing	0.208*** (3.89)	0.175*** (3.27)
Corporate Governance	0.013 (0.37)	0.055 (1.64)
Investment Philosophy	0.014 (0.39)	0.039 (1.14)
Stage Focus	-0.085** (-2.31)	-0.086** (-2.37)
Observations	13375	13375
Unique GPs	679	679
GP FEs	No	Yes
Model	OLS	OLS
DV Mean	6.448	6.448
DV SD	2.016	2.016

Notes: This table shows GP preferences for LP synthetic characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. The specification is $y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \beta \times GovernmentTies_j + \sum_{m=1}^N \gamma_m \times Characteristic_{jm} + \epsilon_{ij}$. The sample includes all GP respondents participating in the experiments who gave at least one valid answer to each question. *GovernmentTies* is a dummy indicating whether the LP profile displays a link to the government. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Table A7. Partner Rating is on a scale of 1-10. Column 1 shows the basic models. Column 2 shows regressions adding GP respondents fixed effects. Standard Errors are clustered at the respondent level. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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TABLE A14. GP Preferences for LPs: Robustness Sample Splits

	Job Position				Expected Interest		Perceived Importance	
	(1) Partner	(2) Director	(3) Manager	(4) Other	(5) High	(6) Low	(7) High	(8) Low
Government Ties	-0.090 (-1.53)	-0.007 (-0.07)	-0.180*** (-2.86)	-0.146 (-0.70)	-0.066* (-1.68)	-0.131** (-2.08)	-0.111* (-1.85)	-0.118** (-2.29)
Large Investor	0.131** (2.49)	0.173* (1.92)	0.168*** (2.95)	0.062 (0.33)	0.008 (0.23)	0.235*** (4.11)	0.207*** (3.87)	0.099** (2.14)
High Registered Capital	0.174*** (3.26)	-0.010 (-0.11)	0.293*** (5.10)	0.271 (1.43)	0.030 (0.84)	0.271*** (4.75)	0.176*** (3.25)	0.214*** (4.56)
Industry Information	-0.209*** (-4.00)	-0.112 (-1.25)	-0.263*** (-4.66)	-0.579*** (-3.19)	-0.019 (-0.54)	-0.360*** (-6.41)	-0.261*** (-4.94)	-0.207*** (-4.51)
Young LP	-0.026 (-0.49)	0.014 (0.15)	0.072 (1.26)	-0.470** (-2.53)	0.007 (0.20)	-0.028 (-0.50)	-0.003 (-0.06)	-0.007 (-0.15)
Headquarter In Foreign Country	0.035 (0.39)	-0.184 (-1.05)	0.057 (0.56)	0.514* (1.83)	-0.071 (-1.08)	0.132 (1.36)	0.121 (1.29)	-0.035 (-0.43)
Headquarter In Beijing	0.237*** (2.99)	0.281** (2.29)	0.102 (1.21)	0.455 (1.59)	0.001 (0.03)	0.316*** (3.55)	0.161** (2.03)	0.241*** (3.56)
Corporate Governance	0.011 (0.21)	0.006 (0.06)	0.026 (0.47)	-0.085 (-0.47)	0.033 (0.95)	-0.014 (-0.24)	0.001 (0.02)	0.024 (0.51)
Investment Philosophy	0.050 (0.91)	0.102 (1.10)	-0.040 (-0.69)	-0.117 (-0.62)	0.051 (1.38)	-0.055 (-0.95)	0.001 (0.01)	0.023 (0.49)
Stage Focus	-0.095* (-1.80)	-0.005 (-0.06)	-0.088 (-1.55)	-0.151 (-0.81)	0.016 (0.46)	-0.170*** (-2.99)	-0.031 (-0.58)	-0.126*** (-2.72)
Observations	6119	1769	4917	570	6856	6519	5783	7592
Unique GPs	311	89	249	30	672	676	293	386
GP FEs	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Model	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
DV Mean	6.411	6.575	6.478	6.182	7.072	5.791	6.414	6.473
DV SD	2.051	1.885	1.992	2.202	1.458	2.294	2.024	2.010

Notes: This table reports the main results on GP preferences for LP characteristics for different sample splits, namely for different respondents' job positions, for high versus low expected interest in a given synthetic profile, and for high versus low stated perceived importance of our matching exercise. The specification is $y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \beta \times GovernmentTies_j + \sum_{m=1}^N \gamma_m \times Characteristic_{jm} + \epsilon_{ij}$. *GovernmentTies* is a dummy indicating whether the LP profile displays a link to the government. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Table A7. Partner Rating is on a scale of 1-10. Column 1-4 show regressions for different groups of GPs depending on the respondents' job position. Columns 5 and 6 show regressions for different groups of observations, namely those with an above-median versus below-median rating of Expected Interest (i.e., our second dimension over which GPs rate each synthetic profile). Columns 7 and 8 show regressions for different groups of GPs depending on whether their stated perceived importance of our matching exercise is above-median or below-median. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE A15. GP Preferences for LPs: Heterogeneity across Robustness Sample Splits and Government Ownership

	Job Position								Expected Interest				Perceived Importance			
	Partner		Director		Manager		Other		High		Low		High		Low	
	(1) Gov	(2) Non-Gov	(3) Gov	(4) Non-Gov	(5) Gov	(6) Non-Gov	(7) Gov	(8) Non-Gov	(9) Gov	(10) Non-Gov	(11) Gov	(12) Non-Gov	(13) Gov	(14) Non-Gov	(15) Gov	(16) Non-Gov
Government Ties	0.238 (1.65)	-0.158** (-2.44)	0.016 (0.10)	0.010 (0.08)	-0.093 (-0.96)	-0.255*** (-3.06)	0.422 (1.34)	-0.295 (-1.12)	0.061 (0.88)	-0.123*** (-2.58)	-0.009 (-0.08)	-0.184** (-2.44)	0.001 (0.01)	-0.161** (-2.22)	0.031 (0.33)	-0.185*** (-2.99)
Large Investor	0.175 (1.37)	0.127** (2.21)	0.252* (1.70)	0.096 (0.87)	0.171** (1.96)	0.162** (2.14)	0.198 (0.74)	0.078 (0.32)	0.004 (0.06)	0.010 (0.22)	0.298*** (2.84)	0.212*** (3.09)	0.284*** (3.00)	0.166** (2.55)	0.101 (1.19)	0.099* (1.78)
High Registered Capital	0.350*** (2.64)	0.145** (2.48)	-0.158 (-1.05)	0.092 (0.82)	0.336*** (3.81)	0.257*** (3.38)	-0.563*** (-2.06)	0.649*** (2.72)	0.014 (0.21)	0.035 (0.81)	0.281*** (2.71)	0.272*** (3.98)	0.308*** (3.19)	0.110* (1.69)	0.129 (1.50)	0.252*** (4.48)
Industry Information	-0.084 (-0.65)	-0.236*** (-4.12)	-0.135 (-0.92)	-0.060 (-0.54)	-0.311*** (-3.64)	-0.223*** (-2.98)	-0.917*** (-3.00)	-0.329 (-1.45)	-0.046 (-0.73)	-0.010 (-0.22)	-0.401*** (-3.91)	-0.345*** (-5.12)	-0.312*** (-3.32)	-0.241*** (-3.76)	-0.204** (-2.44)	-0.210*** (-3.82)
Young LP	-0.111 (-0.86)	-0.009 (-0.16)	-0.179 (-1.22)	0.150 (1.34)	0.138 (1.61)	0.014 (0.18)	-0.144 (-0.52)	-0.699*** (-2.95)	-0.005 (-0.08)	0.011 (0.25)	-0.062 (-0.60)	-0.013 (-0.19)	0.008 (0.08)	-0.012 (-0.18)	0.012 (0.14)	-0.016 (-0.28)
Headquarter In Foreign Country	0.096 (0.45)	0.020 (0.20)	-0.403 (-1.42)	-0.010 (-0.04)	0.106 (0.70)	0.023 (0.16)	0.431 (0.96)	0.572 (1.57)	-0.068 (-0.57)	-0.071 (-0.89)	0.069 (0.39)	0.162 (1.37)	0.244 (1.48)	0.066 (0.57)	-0.149 (-1.01)	0.017 (0.17)
Headquarter In Beijing	0.226 (1.13)	0.231*** (2.68)	0.343* (1.65)	0.252* (1.71)	0.312** (2.44)	-0.067 (-0.60)	-0.415 (-0.89)	0.842** (2.49)	0.087 (0.89)	-0.038 (-0.60)	0.408** (2.54)	0.274** (2.55)	0.314** (2.16)	0.087 (0.92)	0.243** (1.96)	0.238*** (2.93)
Corporate Governance	0.016 (0.13)	0.014 (0.24)	0.155 (1.06)	-0.087 (-0.78)	-0.011 (-0.13)	0.054 (0.71)	0.655** (2.32)	-0.387* (-1.71)	0.080 (1.27)	0.013 (0.31)	0.012 (0.12)	-0.023 (-0.34)	0.104 (1.10)	-0.051 (-0.79)	0.003 (0.03)	0.036 (0.65)
Investment Philosophy	-0.081 (-0.61)	0.079 (1.31)	0.169 (1.09)	0.064 (0.57)	-0.014 (-0.16)	-0.057 (-0.73)	0.331 (1.13)	-0.161 (-0.69)	0.090 (1.37)	0.036 (0.81)	-0.108 (-1.03)	-0.029 (-0.41)	0.061 (0.63)	-0.026 (-0.39)	-0.042 (-0.49)	0.052 (0.91)
Stage Focus	0.080 (0.62)	-0.126** (-2.18)	-0.194 (-1.30)	0.121 (1.09)	-0.126 (-1.47)	-0.047 (-0.62)	0.132 (0.45)	-0.278 (-1.20)	-0.010 (-0.15)	0.027 (0.64)	-0.077 (-0.74)	-0.207*** (-3.04)	-0.016 (-0.16)	-0.033 (-0.51)	-0.132 (-1.57)	-0.121** (-2.17)
Observations	1011	5108	760	1009	2270	2647	180	390	2183	4673	2038	4481	1901	3882	2320	5272
Unique GPs	52	259	38	51	115	134	9	21	212	460	213	463	96	197	118	268
GP FEs	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Model	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
DV Mean	6.408	6.412	6.470	6.654	6.449	6.502	6.667	5.959	7.071	7.072	5.789	5.792	6.417	6.412	6.481	6.470
DV SD	2.044	2.052	2.029	1.766	2.053	1.938	1.849	2.315	1.465	1.455	2.336	2.275	2.061	2.005	2.020	2.006

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Notes: This table compares government GP and nongovernment GP preferences for LP synthetic characteristics for different sample splits, namely for different respondents' job positions, for high versus low expected interest in a given synthetic profile, and for high versus low stated perceived importance of our matching exercise. The specification is $y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \beta \times GovernmentTies_j + \sum_{m=1}^N \gamma_m \times Characteristic_{jm} + \epsilon_{ij}$. We run separate regressions for government GPs and nongovernment GPs and for each sample split. Gov-GPs are defined as GPs with government owners. The sample includes all GP respondents participating in the experiments who gave at least one valid answer to each question within each specific group. *GovernmentTies* is a dummy indicating whether the LP profile displays a link to the government. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Table A7. Partner Rating is on a scale of 1-10. Column 1-8 show regressions for different groups of GPs depending on the respondents' job position. Columns 9-12 show regressions for different groups of observations, namely those with an above-median versus below-median rating of Expected Interest (i.e., our second dimension over which GPs rate each synthetic profile). Columns 13-16 show regressions for different groups of GPs depending on whether their stated perceived importance of our matching exercise is above-median or below-median. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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TABLE A16. Variables in Synthetic GP Profiles

Variables	Description
Government Investors	A dummy indicating whether the GP has government investors.
Team Government Experience	A dummy indicating whether the GP's team has experience in government.
Team Industry Experience	A dummy indicating whether the GP's team has experience in industry.
High AUM	A dummy indicating whether the GP has high AUM (> 500 million yuan).
High IRR	A dummy indicating whether the GP obtained past high IRR ($\geq 30\%$).
Exits	A dummy indicating whether the GP had past successful exits.
Ranked GP	A dummy indicating whether the profile is a top GP (a GP that has ever been ranked in top lists).
Industry Information	A dummy indicating whether the GP profile shows industry information.
Young GP	A dummy indicating whether the GP is a young GP (founded after 2010).
Headquarter in Foreign Country	A dummy indicating whether the GP is headquartered in a foreign country.
Headquarter in Beijing	A dummy indicating whether the GP is located in Beijing.
VC	A dummy indicating whether the GP is a VC (and not a PE).
Market Approach	A dummy indicating whether the GP profile displays description of market approach.
Investment Philosophy	A dummy indicating whether the GP profile displays description of investment philosophy.
Investment Stage	A dummy indicating whether the GP profile displays the targeted stage of investments.
Investment Horizon	A dummy indicating whether the GP profile displays the typical investment horizon.
Serial Fund Manager	A dummy indicating whether the GP has managed funds in the past.

Notes: This table illustrates the coding of regressors based on original profile components. The first column shows the main regressors. The second column gives a brief description of the variables. See Appendix Table A17 for details on all profile components.

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TABLE A17. Description of GP Profiles Randomized Components

Variable	Categorical Value	Options			
Government Investors (0.25)	Government Investors: 1 if government-related [2,3].	1 The investors include insurance, banking, and other financial institutions. 投资人包括国内保险、银行等金融机构。	2 The investors include national as well as local provincial and municipal governments. 投资人包括国家和地方省市市政府引导基金。	3 The firm has been actively involved in industries with local government support. 公司积极参与地方政府支持的产业建设。	
Team Government Experience (0.25)	Team Government Experience: 1 if team members have government-related experience [1-6].	1 Team members have worked in the local government and as leaders in the entrepreneurship development of the local government for many years, 合伙人多年来在当地政府或地方政府的创业发展中担任重要职位。	2 The team members have profound legal working experience with IPOs, and are very familiar with the policies and regulations of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), and with its regulation and risk management policies, 团队拥有丰富的上市法律经验,熟悉中国证监会的政策法规、监管和风险管理。	3 The partners worked in government departments for many years, and gained extensive experience in capital management, corporate mergers and acquisitions, and IPOs, 合伙人多年在政府部门工作,在资本管理、企业并购和上市融资方面积累了丰富的经验。	4 The team consists of both government officials and industry experts, who are skilled in project selection, 团队来自政府和行业专家,带来丰富的项目选择经验。
		5 The partners have over 10 years of working experience in state-owned companies, state-owned banks, and SASAC (State-owned Asset Supervision and Administration Commission), 合伙人在国有企业、国有银行或国资委等拥有超过10年的工作经验。	6 The team has deep connections with the government thanks to the leading role played in equity investments in major successful projects, 团队与政府建立深厚联系,积累丰富经验,成功领导了许多里程碑项目的股权投资。		
Team Industry Experience (0.25)	Team Industry Experience: 1 if team members have industry-related experience [1-7].	1 The team lead previous investments in numerous projects and has achieved remarkable success, and has accumulated experience in assessing, structuring and managing investments in China's unique environment, 团队投资了各种项目,并创造很多成功案例,积累了在中国独特环境下的投资经验。	2 The individual partners obtained more than 10 patents on leading technologies, 合伙人拥有超过10项领先技术专利。	3 The team has extensive experience in asset management and investment banking, 团队在资产管理和投资银行行业拥有丰富的经验。	4 The partners have rich practical experiences in and deep understandings of China's capital market; they also have sharp insights and good judgment about the macroeconomic situation, industrial policies, and project investment. 合伙人对宏观经济形势有敏锐的洞察力,对中国的资本市场有深刻的理解和丰富的实践经验,对产业政策和项目投资具有良好的前瞻性和判断力。
		5 During the past 9 years, the team led the investment in 8 companies, and 3 of them went public on the NASDAQ, 过去9年中,团队主导投资8家企业,其中3家在纳斯达克上市。	6 The co-founder previously worked at McKinsey & Co., Inc. and Goldman Sachs & Co., and had participated in several major investments, 创始人之前曾在麦肯锡和高盛工作,参与多个企业融资业务。	7 The team won the prize of China's Top Ten Venture Capitalist and of best investors in the field of new technology, 团队成员曾获得中国最佳创业投资家奖10强,新技术领域的最佳投资者。	
AUM (0.8)	High AUM: 1 if >500 Million [4-8].	1 The firm managed 200 Million yuan of capital 公司管理资金数额为2亿元。	2 The firm's total assets under management are close to 450 Million yuan 机构管理的总资产接近4.5亿元。	3 The firm has 500 Million yuan of capital to manage 公司管理资金5亿元。	4 The firm managed over 800 Million yuan 公司管理资金总额超过8亿元。
		5 The corporation managed 1 Billion yuan 机构管理10亿元人民币。	6 The company managed projects for a total amount of 2.5 Billion yuan 公司管理基金投资项目25亿元。	7 The firm has assets under management that amount to over 5 Billion yuan 机构资产管理规模超过50亿元。	8 The firm has raised more than 10 billion yuan for its previous funds 机构吸引管理资金总额超过100亿元。
IRR (0.8)	High IRR: 1 if IRR ≥30% [5-8].	1 achieved an average IRR of 10%. 达到投资项目的平均IRR接近10%。	2 reached a comprehensive IRR of 15%. 完成投资项目总IRR达到15%。	3 led to an average IRR of 20%. 投资平均回报率为20%。	4 achieved a comprehensive IRR of 25%. 综合IRR达到25%。
		5 lead to great performance with an IRR of 30%. 取得了良好的业绩,IRR为30%。	6 and the investment portfolios reached an IRR of 35%. 投资组合的IRR为35%。	7 achieved an IRR of 60% that largely surpassed that of its competitors. IRR达到了60%,远远超过了同行业竞争对手。	8 reached the best performance in the venture capital industry with IRR higher than 100%. 团队在风险投资行业中表现突出,IRR超过100%。

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Table A17 (cont.): Description of GP Profiles Randomized Components

Variable	Categorical Value	Options			
Investments and Exits (0.8)	Exits: 1 if show successful exits [3-8].	1 The firm supported 8 start-ups, 投资了8家初创公司.	2 It made 20 investments in the past five years, 过去5年进行了超20笔投资.	3 It invested in over 15 projects across China, and had 8 successful exits through trade sales and M&A activity, 在中国各地投资了15个项目, 成功退出了8家企业.	4 It invested in 18 companies across various regions in China, three of which have since gone public, 在中国不同地区投资了18家公司, 3个投资项目已上市.
		5 It made 12 investments in the past five years, 3 of which have gone public in both domestic and international stock exchanges, 在过去5年中, 共投资12家企业, 其中3家已在国内或国际证券交易所上市.	6 By the end of 2018, the firm has made investments in 25 portfolio companies and has had 6 of them listed and 5 of them with successful exits through acquisitions, 截至2018年底, 已投资25家公司, 其中6家上市, 5家通过并购成功退出.	7 It invested in over 50 projects, which lead to 15 listed companies, 在中国各地投资了50多个项目, 培育了15家上市公司.	8 Over the past years, the firm has invested in more than 100 technology companies worldwide, with more than 20 of them going public or getting listed on the National Equities Exchange and Quotations (NEEQ), 在过去的几年里, 机构在全球范围内投资了100多家科技公司, 已有20多个投资项目上市或在新三板挂牌.
Ranked GP (0.025)	Ranked GP: 1 if GP is top ranked [1-4].	1 The company was ranked among the Top 20 VC Firms of the Year in 2018. 被评为2018年中国创业投资机构前20强.	2 The firm won the Top 50 VC Firms of the Year 2018. 赢得2018年中国创业投资机构前50强的荣誉.	3 It was recognized among the Top 20 PE Firms of the Year in each of the past five years. 多次被评为年度私募股权投资机构20强.	4 The private equity firm was ranked as the Top 50 PE Firms of the Year 2018. 成为2018年最佳50家私募投资机构.
Industry (0.5)	Industry: 1 if show industry information [1-16].	1 It focuses on the Internet industry and provides financing service for enterprises in the industry. 重点投向互联网行业, 并为企业提供金融服务.	2 In the past, the company has successfully completed several investments in Social Network and Media. 已投资项目聚集在社交网络和媒体行业.	3 The firm targets investments in information technology and related sectors such as Blockchain, Big Data, Artificial Intelligence, Robot, or Human Face Recognition. 重点投向区块链、大数据、人工智能、机器人或人脸识别等信息技术相关的高科技领域.	4 The firm seeks to invest in Bio and Healthcare industries and actively seeks equity investments or strategic buyouts. 致力于投资生物和医疗保健领域, 并积极寻求股权投资和战略性收购.
		5 The primary industries of past investments include high-tech, high growth companies in clean technology, healthcare, and advanced manufacturing sectors. 优先投资领域为清洁技术、医疗保健、先进制造业.	6 The investment scope includes advanced manufacturing, modern agriculture, and the maritime economy. 重点投资领域包括先进制造业、现代农业和海洋经济.	7 The investments currently comprise primarily online education and training. 公司目前的投资重点是互联网教育和培训.	8 The investment focus is on strategic emerging industries such as biotech, internet, new energy, new materials, new generation of information technology, cultural creativity, energy conservation, and environmental protection. 专注于生物、互联网、新能源、新材料、新一代信息技术、文化创意、节能环保等战略性新兴产业.
		9 The firm focuses on investments in Aerospace related industries, as well as industries such as life and health, ocean, military industry, robots, wearable, and intelligent equipment. 致力于对航空航天相关行业的投资, 同时投向大健康、海洋、军事工业、机器人、可穿戴设备和智能设备等行业.	10 The partners seek opportunities in information technology, energy conservation and environmental protection, new energy, new materials, biotechnology, high-end equipment manufacturing and other national strategic emerging industries. 在信息技术、节能环保、新能源、新材料、生物技术、高端装备制造等国家战略性新兴产业投资.	11 The incubation and investment in the transformation of scientific and technological achievements includes information technology, life sciences and Biological Medicine. 投资科技成果转化孵化, 包括信息技术、生命科学和生物医学.	12 The investment team pays important attention to intelligence-sensitive services, advanced manufacturing, environment protection, and energy saving industries. 重点投向先进制造业、环保和节能产业.
		13 The investment areas are very extensive, and include software and hardware companies, production companies and technology service companies, including home and business mobile communications. 投资领域非常广泛, 包括软件和硬件公司、生产公司和技术服务公司, 涵盖家庭和企业移动通信.	14 It regularly invests in satellite applications, information technology, new materials and new energy, aerospace special technologies, automation and special vehicles and other fields. 一直以来投资于航空航天、卫星应用、信息技术、新材料和新能源、航空航天特殊技术应用、汽车零部件和特种车辆等领域.	15 To promote local high-tech industry, the institution focuses on new materials, new equipment, new energy, new communication technologies, marine tech, energy conservation and environmental protection, and life and health. 重点投向新材料、新设备、新能源、新一代通信技术、海洋高科技、节能环保、生命健康等领域, 促进当地高新技术产业发展.	16 The portfolio covers a broad spectrum of industries: financial services, telecommunications, media technology, energy resources, and life sciences. 投资项目涉及广泛的行业, 金融服务、电信、媒体技术、能源和生命科学.

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Table A17 (cont.): Description of GP Profiles Randomized Components

Variable	Categorical Value	Options			
VC Founding Year (0.5)	VC: 1 if VC [1-11]. Young GP: 1 if founded after 2010 [5-11].	1 The venture capital corporation has 20 years of industry experience. 创业投资机构拥有近20年的行业经验。	2 The venture capital firm was founded in 2007. 风险投资机构成立于2007年。	3 The venture capital firm was founded in 2008. 风险投资机构2008年创立。	4 The venture capital corporation has 10 years of industry experience. 创业投资机构拥有10年的行业经验。
		5 The venture capital company was established at the beginning of 2010. 创业投资机构成立于2010年初。	6 The venture capital firm was established in 2011. 一家成立于2011年的风险投资机构。	7 The venture capital corporation was founded in 2012. 风险投资机构2012年创立。	8 The venture capital firm was founded in 2013. 一家2013年注册成立的风险投资机构。
		9 The growth equity focused firm was founded in 2014 and is specialized in strategic industries. 成立于2014年，专注于战略产业的风险投资机构。	10 The venture capital investor focuses on the Chinese market and was established in 2015. 一家专注于中国市场的风险投资机构，成立于2015年。	11 The venture capital firm was established in 2016. 2016年成立的风险投资机构。	
PE Founding Year (0.5)	PE: 1 if PE [1-11]. Young GP: 1 if founded after 2010 [3-11].	1 The private equity firm was founded in 2008. 私募股权投资机构成立于2008年。	2 The private equity has 10 years of industry experience. 私募股权投资机构拥有10年的行业经验。	3 The private equity company was established at the beginning of 2010. 私募股权投资机构成立于2010年初。	4 The private equity firm was established in 2011. 一家成立于2011年的私募股权投资机构。
		5 The private equity firm was founded in 2012. 私募股权投资机构2012年创立。	6 The private equity firm was founded in 2013. 一家2013年注册成立的私募股权投资机构。	7 The private equity investor focuses on the Chinese market and was established in 2014. 一家专注于中国市场的私募股权投资机构，成立于2014年。	8 The private equity firm was established in 2014. 2014年成立的私募股权投资机构。
		9 The private equity corporation was founded in 2015 and is specialized in emerging industries. 成立于2015年，专注于新兴产业的私募股权投资机构。	10 The private equity firm was established in 2015. 2015年成立的私募股权投资机构。	11 The private equity firm was established in 2016. 一家成立于2016年的私募股权投资机构。	
Location of HQ (0.8)	Headquarter in Foreign Country: 1 if headquarter in Foreign Country [11]. Headquarter in Beijing: 1 if headquarter in Beijing [12-14].	1 located in the Zhejiang Province. 位于浙江省。	2 which invests all over the country. 投资项目覆盖全国各省市。	3 has 15 branches across China. 在中国内地设有15个办公室。	4 headquartered in Shanghai. 总部位于上海市。
		5 located in Shanghai. 位于上海。	6 mainly invests in Shanghai and Yangtze River Delta. 投资主要覆盖上海和长三角地区。	7 located in Guangdong to promote the development of the Greater Bay area. 位于广东，致力于推动大湾区发展。	8 with the investment headquarter located in in Guangzhou. 投资总部设在广州。
		9 located in Shenzhen. 位于深圳。	10 set up 10 branches in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and several other cities. 在北京、上海、深圳等城市设立10个办事处。	11 based in the U.S. and concentrated on Asia and growth markets. 在美国设立，专注于亚洲和新兴市场。	12 located in the Beijing province. 位于北京。
		13 located in Beijing. 位于北京。	14 headquartered in Beijing. 总部位于北京。		

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Table A17 (cont.): Description of GP Profiles Randomized Components

Variable	Categorical Value	Options			
Market Approach (0.8)	Market Approach: 1 if market approach [1-6].	1 This company aims to give full play to the role of the market in allocating resources and expand private capital investments in innovation and entrepreneurship, so as to promote the development of emerging industries. 公司目标是充分发挥市场资源配置和扩大社会资本投资创新创业的作用, 以促进新兴产业发展。	2 With the help of the private capital market and modern management practices, this organization channels capital to sectors of strategic importance and beneficial to social development. 公司依托资本市场, 运用现代管理战略, 吸引各类社会资金投资具有战略意义和促进社会发展的领域。	3 This organization is one of the earliest market-oriented financing platforms in China. The management team is committed to increasing investors' asset value, using modern management methods to protect investors' rights. 公司是最早的以市场为导向的投资融资平台之一, 管理者运用现代管理方式维护投资者权力, 致力于投资者资本保值增值。	4 This organization channels capital to independent innovative enterprises nationwide. It aims to better promote technological innovation through its professional business model and its efficient and reliable market-oriented investment system. 机构面向全国自主创新企业, 并为其提供资金支持, 通过专业的经营模式, 高效可靠的市场化投资体系, 更好地推动科技创新。
		5 It is one of the earliest market-oriented investment firms in China, 中国最早成立的以市场为导向的投资公司之一。	6 Independent decision-making, professionalism, and teamwork define the culture of this organization, 以独立决策、专业精神和团队精神为组织文化。		
Investment Philosophy (0.5)	Investment Philosophy: 1 if investment philosophy is included [1-7].	1 It aims to enhance independent innovation ability through increasing investment into innovative startups, especially science and technology startups. 不断加大和创新企业的投资, 特别是科技型企业, 以提高自主创新能力。	2 It aims to enrich the structure of financial products through technological and management innovation, thus enlarging the space for economic development and social reform. 经营宗旨是: 不断推进技术和管理创新, 丰富金融产品结构, 促进经济发展。	3 Accelerating the improvement of industrial structure through the integration of high-quality social resources is its investment objective. 投资坚持“集合优质社会资源, 促进产业发展”的宗旨。	4 Its long-term goal is to promote the development of high-tech industries in China through providing value-added services related to venture capital investment, thus nurturing strategic industries and promoting the economic transformation. 长期目标是通过提供风险投资相关的增值服务, 促进中国高科技产业的发展。
		5 It helps entrepreneurs become leaders in their industries through working closely with the entrepreneurs on aspects including corporate strategy and business development. 通过与合作伙伴紧密合作, 包括企业战略、业务发展等, 帮助他们成为行业领导者。	6 It supports growing enterprises with various services, with a focus on improving corporate investment strategies and decision-making processes. 着眼于提升企业投资能力和决策能力, 运用多种服务手段为成长型企业提供全方位的增值服务。	7 It is dedicated to helping outstanding entrepreneurs build successful companies, with the mission of helping founders and management teams to scale the great companies of tomorrow. 致力于帮助优秀的企业家建立成功的公司, 并帮助创始人和管理团队打造伟大公司。	

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Table A17 (cont.): Description of GP Profiles Randomized Components

Variable	Categorical Value	Options			
VC Stage (0.4)	Investment Stage: 1 if show stage focus [1-5].	1 which primarily focuses on early-stage venture capital investments. 专注于种子阶段和早期阶段风险投资项目	2 which provides young entrepreneurs with seed and early-stage capital. 集中为创业者提供种子阶段和早期阶段资金。	3 which provides entrepreneurs with early and growth stage financing. 投资主要集中在早期和成长阶段。	4 which is a leading China venture capital firm with substantial experience in early and growth stage financing. 是中国领先的风投公司。在前期和成长阶段融资方面积累了丰富的经验。
		5 which targets expansion-stage investments. 是中国领先的风投公司。在前期和成长阶段融资方面积累了丰富的经验。			
PE Stage (0.4)	Investment Stage: 1 if show stage focus [1-5].	1 which targets expansion-stage investments. 主导扩张阶段的风险投资。	2 which focuses on late-stage investments. 主要后期阶段的投资。	3 which mainly invests in middle to late stage companies. 聚焦中后期阶段投资。	4 by targeting investment in the early, expansion, and late stage. 投资分布早期、成长到后期的不同阶段。
		5 which invests in all stages of the life cycle from early stage to pre-IPO. 投资从早期到上市公司生命周期的所有阶段。			
Investment Horizon (0.4)	Investment Horizon: 1 if show concrete investment horizon [1-5].	1 with an average investment horizon of 3 years, 平均投资期限为3年。	2 mainly focused on long-term investment, 比较关注长期收益。	3 had an average investment horizon of 4 years, 平均投资年限是4年。	4 with an investment horizon of 5 to 7 years, 投资期限为5-7年。
		5 with a strategic of long-term investment and value creation, 战略是长期投资创造价值。			
Funds Managed (0.8)	Serial Fund Manager: 1 if show number of funds managed [1-8].	1 and established ten RMB funds. 设立10只人民币基金。	2 and had successfully raised 12 RMB funds. 成功设立了12支人民币基金。	3 and created more than 15 RMB funds. 拥有15家人民币基金。	4 and set up more than 16 investment funds. 设立了16只投资基金。
		5 with more than 20 venture capital funds raised. 拥有20多个风险投资基金。	6 and raised more than 25 funds with capital from institutional investors. 管理基金25余只。主要来自机构投资者。	7 with a total number of 45 sub-funds. 并且子基金总数达到45个。	8 and became one of the largest investment institutions with more than 60 funds raised and managed. 已成为国内较大的投资机构之一。旗下拥有60多只基金。

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TABLE A18. LP Preferences for GPs: Expected Interest

	Expected Interest	
	(1)	(2)
Government Investors	0.656*** (7.29)	0.675*** (7.42)
Team Government Experience	0.094 (1.14)	0.089 (1.05)
Team Industry Experience	0.104 (1.26)	0.110 (1.30)
High AUM	0.125* (1.70)	0.151** (2.00)
High IRR	0.162** (2.55)	0.186*** (2.87)
Exits	0.058 (0.86)	0.047 (0.68)
Ranked GP	-0.276 (-1.25)	-0.314 (-1.40)
Industry Information	0.595*** (10.13)	0.604*** (10.01)
Young GP	0.171** (2.57)	0.152** (2.21)
Headquarter In Foreign Country	0.211 (1.53)	0.172 (1.22)
Headquarter In Beijing	-0.004 (-0.06)	-0.002 (-0.02)
VC	-0.076 (-0.87)	-0.123 (-1.38)
Market Approach	0.073 (1.02)	0.087 (1.17)
Investment Philosophy	0.033 (0.56)	0.031 (0.52)
Investment Stage	0.003 (0.04)	0.004 (0.06)
Investment Horizon	-0.064 (-1.02)	-0.048 (-0.75)
Serial Fund Manager	-0.124 (-1.37)	-0.157* (-1.70)
Observations	6220	6220
Unique LPs	311	311
LP FEs	No	Yes
Model	OLS	OLS
DV Mean	4.265	4.265
DV SD	2.343	2.343

Notes: This table shows LP preferences for GP synthetic characteristics measured by Expected Interest. The specification is $y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \beta \times GovernmentInvestors_j + \sum_{m=1}^N \gamma_m \times Characteristic_{jm} + \epsilon_{ij}$. The sample includes all LP respondents participating in the experiments who gave at least one valid answer to each question. *GovernmentInvestors* is a dummy indicating whether the GP profile indicates the GP already had government investors. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Appendix Table A16. Expected Interest is on a scale of 1-10. Column 1 shows the basic models. Column 2 shows regressions adding LP respondents fixed effects. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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TABLE A19. LP Preferences for GPs (Ordered Probit)

	Partner Rating	
	(1)	(2)
Government Investors	0.270*** (6.78)	0.302*** (7.36)
Team Government Experience	0.083** (2.25)	0.082** (2.18)
Team Industry Experience	0.024 (0.65)	0.020 (0.52)
High AUM	0.001 (0.04)	0.015 (0.46)
High IRR	0.065** (2.33)	0.071** (2.46)
Exits	0.068** (2.27)	0.074** (2.40)
Ranked GP	-0.108 (-1.05)	-0.102 (-0.97)
Industry Information	0.264*** (10.06)	0.278*** (10.20)
Young GP	0.072** (2.42)	0.057* (1.85)
Headquarter In Foreign Country	0.221*** (4.03)	0.217*** (3.82)
Headquarter In Beijing	0.032 (0.92)	0.032 (0.89)
VC	0.013 (0.34)	-0.001 (-0.04)
Market Approach	0.049 (1.52)	0.048 (1.46)
Investment Philosophy	-0.020 (-0.75)	-0.028 (-1.05)
Investment Stage	0.034 (1.07)	0.035 (1.06)
Investment Horizon	-0.049* (-1.80)	-0.050* (-1.75)
Serial Fund Manager	0.027 (0.67)	0.012 (0.29)
Observations	6220	6220
Unique LPs	311	311
LP FEs	No	Yes
Model	Ordered Probit	Ordered Probit
DV Mean	4.284	4.284
DV SD	2.326	2.326

Notes: This table shows LP preferences for GP synthetic characteristics using an ordered probit model. Ordered probit cutpoints (column 1): -0.75, -0.24, 0.17, 0.52, 1.07, 1.29, 1.57, 1.96; (column 2): -0.94, -0.42, 0.01, 0.38, 0.95, 1.17, 1.46, 1.86. The sample includes all LP respondents participating in the experiments who gave at least one valid answer to each question. *GovernmentInvestors* is a dummy indicating whether the GP profile indicates the GP already had government investors. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Appendix Table A16. Partner Rating is on a 1-10 scale. Column 1 shows the basic models. Column 2 shows regressions adding LP respondents fixed effects. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

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TABLE A20. LP Preferences for GPs: Clustering SEs at Respondent Level

	Partner Rating	
	(1)	(2)
Government Investors	0.652*** (7.13)	0.692*** (7.16)
Team Government Experience	0.196** (2.47)	0.191** (2.27)
Team Industry Experience	0.050 (0.65)	0.041 (0.50)
High AUM	0.025 (0.34)	0.056 (0.74)
High IRR	0.153** (2.58)	0.159** (2.56)
Exits	0.151** (2.40)	0.160** (2.44)
Top GP	-0.271 (-1.16)	-0.252 (-1.03)
Industry Information	0.631*** (10.75)	0.637*** (10.41)
Young GP	0.172*** (2.60)	0.137** (1.98)
Headquarter In Foreign Country	0.490*** (4.09)	0.466*** (3.65)
Headquarter In Beijing	0.069 (0.90)	0.065 (0.81)
VC	0.019 (0.22)	-0.010 (-0.11)
Market Approach	0.111 (1.56)	0.106 (1.44)
Investment Philosophy	-0.029 (-0.51)	-0.042 (-0.70)
Investment Stage	0.076 (1.10)	0.072 (0.99)
Investment Horizon	-0.101* (-1.71)	-0.094 (-1.47)
Serial Fund Manager	0.042 (0.48)	0.007 (0.08)
Observations	6220	6220
Unique LPs	311	311
LP FEs	No	Yes
Model	OLS	OLS
DV Mean	4.284	4.284
DV SD	2.326	2.326

Notes: This table shows LP preferences for GP synthetic characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the respondent level. The specification is $y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \beta \times GovernmentInvestors_j + \sum_{m=1}^N \gamma_m \times Characteristic_{jm} + \epsilon_{ij}$. The sample includes all LP respondents participating in the experiments who gave at least one valid answer to each question. *GovernmentInvestors* is a dummy indicating whether the GP profile indicates the GP already had government investors. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Appendix Table A16. Partner Rating is on a 1-10 scale. Column 1 shows the basic models. Column 2 shows regressions adding LP respondents fixed effects. Standard Errors are clustered at the respondent level. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

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TABLE A21. LP Preferences for GPs: Heterogeneity by Government-Owned LPs

	(1) Gov	(2) Non-Gov	(1)=(2) P-Value	(3) Gov	(4) Non-Gov	(3)=(4) P-Value
Government Investors	0.714*** (6.96)	0.431** (2.34)	0.178	0.762*** (7.33)	0.447** (2.36)	0.134
Team Government Experience	0.146 (1.54)	0.342** (2.11)	0.292	0.120 (1.26)	0.397** (2.38)	0.137
Team Industry Experience	0.036 (0.38)	0.096 (0.56)	0.759	0.035 (0.37)	0.069 (0.40)	0.862
High AUM	0.038 (0.46)	-0.025 (-0.17)	0.709	0.086 (1.03)	-0.046 (-0.30)	0.433
High IRR	0.097 (1.36)	0.341*** (2.67)	0.094	0.101 (1.38)	0.352*** (2.72)	0.082
Exits	0.188** (2.49)	0.025 (0.18)	0.303	0.195** (2.51)	0.041 (0.29)	0.330
Ranked GP	-0.322 (-1.23)	-0.193 (-0.46)	0.792	-0.304 (-1.18)	-0.200 (-0.46)	0.834
Industry Information	0.642*** (9.61)	0.597*** (5.04)	0.738	0.643*** (9.44)	0.632*** (5.11)	0.938
Young GP	0.157** (2.07)	0.220* (1.65)	0.683	0.116 (1.49)	0.208 (1.51)	0.549
Headquarter In Foreign Country	0.508*** (3.42)	0.449* (1.82)	0.839	0.456*** (3.06)	0.503* (1.94)	0.872
Headquarter In Beijing	0.031 (0.35)	0.198 (1.20)	0.372	0.032 (0.35)	0.178 (1.06)	0.432
VC	0.008 (0.08)	0.059 (0.34)	0.798	-0.041 (-0.41)	0.088 (0.50)	0.510
Market Approach	0.142* (1.72)	-0.005 (-0.03)	0.381	0.136 (1.61)	-0.006 (-0.04)	0.395
Investment Philosophy	-0.013 (-0.19)	-0.067 (-0.57)	0.689	-0.015 (-0.22)	-0.120 (-1.00)	0.434
Investment Stage	0.059 (0.72)	0.142 (0.97)	0.617	0.056 (0.68)	0.123 (0.80)	0.692
Investment Horizon	-0.078 (-1.10)	-0.164 (-1.34)	0.542	-0.059 (-0.82)	-0.202 (-1.61)	0.309
Serial Fund Manager	0.056 (0.54)	-0.018 (-0.10)	0.720	0.021 (0.20)	-0.059 (-0.32)	0.696
Observations	4760	1460		4760	1460	
Unique LPs	238	73		238	73	
LP FEs	No	No		Yes	Yes	
Model	OLS	OLS	SUR	OLS	OLS	SUR
DV Mean	4.284	4.284		4.284	4.284	
DV SD	2.326	2.326		2.326	2.326	

Notes: This table compares government LP and nongovernment LP preferences for LP synthetic characteristics. The specification is $y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \beta \times GovernmentTies_j + \sum_{m=1}^N \gamma_m \times Characteristic_{jm} + \epsilon_{ij}$. We run separate regressions for government LPs and nongovernment LPs. Gov-LPs are defined as LPs with government owners. The sample includes all LP respondents participating in the experiments who gave at least one valid answer to each question. *GovernmentInvestors* is a dummy indicating whether the GP profile indicates the GP already had government investors. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Appendix Table A16. Partner Rating is on a scale of 1-10. Columns 1 and 2 show the basic models for government LPs and nongovernment LPs respectively. Column 3 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 1 and 2 using SUR model. Columns 4 and 5 show regressions with LP respondents fixed effects. Column 6 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 4 and 5 using SUR model. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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TABLE A22. GP Preferences for LPs: Heterogeneity by Government-Owned GPs and across Government Levels

	(1) Gov	(2) Non-Gov	(1)=(2) P-Value	(3) Gov	(4) Non-Gov	(3)=(4) P-Value
GovTies-Central	-0.348* (-1.89)	-0.311** (-2.32)	0.870	-0.388** (-2.27)	-0.292** (-2.45)	0.637
GovTies-Provincial	0.047 (0.61)	-0.184*** (-3.59)	0.012	0.045 (0.62)	-0.120** (-2.52)	0.052
GovTies-Local	0.221 (1.24)	0.052 (0.49)	0.413	0.201 (1.15)	0.077 (0.73)	0.531
Large Investor	0.186*** (2.95)	0.131*** (3.12)	0.474	0.187*** (3.10)	0.157*** (3.94)	0.673
High Registered Capital	0.212*** (3.29)	0.191*** (4.49)	0.788	0.164*** (2.67)	0.195*** (4.88)	0.656
Industry Information	-0.254*** (-4.07)	-0.222*** (-5.33)	0.673	-0.171*** (-2.83)	-0.181*** (-4.59)	0.880
Young LP	0.010 (0.16)	-0.010 (-0.23)	0.796	-0.007 (-0.11)	-0.011 (-0.27)	0.957
Headquarter In Foreign Country	0.037 (0.33)	0.043 (0.57)	0.964	-0.081 (-0.72)	0.017 (0.23)	0.451
Headquarter In Beijing	0.329*** (3.37)	0.193*** (3.03)	0.242	0.278*** (2.92)	0.173*** (2.82)	0.342
Corporate Governance	0.046 (0.73)	-0.002 (-0.06)	0.521	0.123** (2.04)	0.025 (0.64)	0.165
Investment Philosophy	0.008 (0.13)	0.021 (0.48)	0.871	0.051 (0.82)	0.038 (0.92)	0.858
Stage Focus	-0.081 (-1.28)	-0.085** (-2.01)	0.960	-0.115* (-1.89)	-0.072* (-1.80)	0.544
Observations	4221	9154		4221	9154	
Unique GPs	214	465		214	465	
GP FEs	No	No		Yes	Yes	
Model	OLS	OLS	SUR	OLS	OLS	SUR
DV Mean	6.452	6.445		6.452	6.445	
DV SD	2.038	2.006		2.038	2.006	

Notes: This table compares government GP and nongovernment GP preferences for LP synthetic characteristics where LPs' government ties are divided into 3 levels, Central, Provincial and Local. The specification is $y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \beta \times GovernmentTies_j + \sum_{m=1}^N \gamma_m \times Characteristic_{jm} + \epsilon_{ij}$. We run separate regressions for government GPs and nongovernment GPs. Gov-GPs are defined as GPs with government owners. The sample includes all GP respondents participating in the experiments who gave at least one valid answer to each question. *GovTies-Central*, *GovTies-Provincial* and *GovTies-Local* are dummy variables indicating whether the LP profile displays a link to the central, provincial and local government. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Table A7. Partner Rating is on a scale of 1-10. Columns 1 and 2 show the basic models for government GPs and nongovernment GPs respectively. Column 3 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 1 and 2 using SUR model. Columns 4 and 5 show regressions with GP respondents fixed effects. Column 6 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 4 and 5 using SUR model. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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TABLE A23. GP Preferences for LPs: Heterogeneity by Respondent Type

	(1) Partner Rating
Large Investor	0.149*** (4.25)
High Registered Capital	0.196*** (5.52)
Industry Information	-0.232*** (-6.71)
Young LP	-0.005 (-0.13)
Headquarter In Foreign Country	0.034 (0.55)
Headquarter In Beijing	0.208*** (4.03)
Corporate Governance	0.013 (0.36)
Investment Philosophy	0.016 (0.45)
Stage Focus	-0.085** (-2.42)
Gov GP=0 × High Quality GP=0 × Government Ties=1	-0.150*** (-2.62)
Gov GP=0 × High Quality GP=1 × Government Ties=0	-0.031 (-0.58)
Gov GP=0 × High Quality GP=1 × Government Ties=1	-0.233*** (-3.39)
Gov GP=1 × High Quality GP=0 × Government Ties=0	-0.089 (-1.46)
Gov GP=1 × High Quality GP=0 × Government Ties=1	-0.128 (-1.50)
Gov GP=1 × High Quality GP=1 × Government Ties=0	-0.041 (-0.65)
Gov GP=1 × High Quality GP=1 × Government Ties=1	0.011 (0.13)
Observations	13375
Unique GPs	679
GP FEs	No
Model	OLS
DV Mean	6.448
DV SD	2.016

Notes: This table shows GP preferences for LP synthetic characteristics, adding joint respondents' government ownership and quality grouping. The specification is $y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \sum_{k=1}^7 \beta_k GovGP_i \times HighQualityGP_i \times GovernmentTies_j + \sum_{m=1}^N \gamma_m \times Characteristic_{jm} + \epsilon_{ij}$, where i is the GP respondent, and j indicates the synthetic LP profile. The sample includes all GP respondents participating in the experiments who gave at least one valid answer to each question. *GovernmentTies* is a dummy indicating whether the LP profile displays a link to the government. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Table A7. Partner Rating is on a scale of 1-10. *GovGP* indicates whether the GP respondent is government owned, defined as GP with ultimate government owners. *HighQualityGP* indicates whether the GP respondent is a high quality GP, defined as GP with above-median comprehensive return or that has ever been top-ranked by Zero2IPO. t statistics are presented in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

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TABLE A24. GP Preferences for LPs: Heterogeneity by Government-Owned GPs, Controlling for Same Industry and Region)

	(1) Gov	(2) Non-Gov	(1)=(2) P-Value	(3) Gov	(4) Non-Gov	(3)=(4) P-Value
Government Ties	0.028 (0.40)	-0.173*** (-3.66)	0.018	0.020 (0.30)	-0.112** (-2.54)	0.093
Large Investor	0.188*** (2.98)	0.131*** (3.12)	0.458	0.190*** (3.15)	0.157*** (3.94)	0.640
High Registered Capital	0.209*** (3.26)	0.188*** (4.43)	0.787	0.161*** (2.63)	0.195*** (4.87)	0.634
Industry Information	-0.344*** (-4.16)	-0.290*** (-5.54)	0.584	-0.304*** (-3.74)	-0.248*** (-4.93)	0.555
Young LP	0.012 (0.20)	-0.012 (-0.29)	0.744	-0.006 (-0.10)	-0.013 (-0.33)	0.919
Headquarter In Foreign Country	0.079 (0.67)	0.039 (0.49)	0.777	-0.050 (-0.41)	0.033 (0.42)	0.549
Headquarter In Beijing	0.262*** (2.75)	0.176*** (2.83)	0.448	0.211** (2.27)	0.146** (2.44)	0.547
Corporate Governance	0.051 (0.81)	-0.001 (-0.02)	0.492	0.129** (2.14)	0.026 (0.66)	0.145
Investment Philosophy	0.009 (0.13)	0.021 (0.49)	0.873	0.049 (0.80)	0.039 (0.94)	0.880
Stage Focus	-0.081 (-1.29)	-0.085** (-2.01)	0.964	-0.114* (-1.87)	-0.071* (-1.79)	0.549
Same Investment Region	0.092 (1.35)	0.003 (0.06)	0.275	0.070 (0.94)	0.038 (0.81)	0.715
Same Investment Industry	0.155* (1.69)	0.131** (2.15)	0.827	0.229** (2.46)	0.129** (2.14)	0.355
Observations	4221	9154		4221	9154	
Unique GPs	214	465		214	465	
GP FEs	No	No		Yes	Yes	
Model	OLS	OLS	SUR	OLS	OLS	SUR
DV Mean	6.452	6.445		6.452	6.445	
DV SD	2.038	2.006		2.038	2.006	

Notes: This table compares government GP and nongovernment GP preferences for LP synthetic characteristics, controlling for whether the respondent is focused on the same investment industry and same investment region displayed in the synthetic partner profile. The specification is $y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \beta \times GovernmentTies_j + \sum_{m=1}^N \gamma_m \times Characteristic_{jm} + \sum_{k=1}^2 \rho_k \times RobustnessCheckTerm_{jk} + \epsilon_{ij}$. We run separate regressions for government GPs and nongovernment GPs. Gov-GPs are defined as GPs with government owners. The sample includes all GP respondents participating in the experiments who gave at least one valid answer to each question. *GovernmentTies* is a dummy indicating whether the LP profile displays a link to the government. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Table A7. *Same Investment Region* and *Same Investment Industry* indicate whether the synthetic LP has same investment region or investment industry of the GP respondent, respectively. Province-level matching is used when constructing the *Same Region*. 4-digit level industrial classification (or the finest available classification) is used when constructing the *Same Industry*. Partner Rating is on a scale of 1-10. Columns 1 and 2 show the basic models for government GPs and nongovernment GPs respectively. Column 3 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 1 and 2 using SUR model. Columns 4 and 5 show regressions with GP respondents fixed effects. Column 6 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 4 and 5 using SUR model. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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TABLE A25. GP Preferences for LPs, Controlling for Same Industry and Region

	Partner Rating	
	(1)	(2)
Government Ties	-0.109*** (-2.79)	-0.070* (-1.89)
Large Investor	0.148*** (4.24)	0.168*** (5.06)
High Registered Capital	0.195*** (5.51)	0.185*** (5.53)
Industry Information	-0.305*** (-6.91)	-0.264*** (-6.17)
Young LP	-0.004 (-0.12)	-0.010 (-0.29)
Headquarter In Foreign Country	0.051 (0.79)	0.007 (0.10)
Headquarter In Beijing	0.203*** (3.91)	0.167*** (3.32)
Corporate Governance	0.016 (0.45)	0.058* (1.75)
Investment Philosophy	0.015 (0.42)	0.041 (1.20)
Stage Focus	-0.086** (-2.45)	-0.086** (-2.57)
Same Investment Region	0.033 (0.87)	0.050 (1.25)
Same Investment Industry	0.138*** (2.73)	0.160*** (3.15)
Observations	13375	13375
Unique GPs	679	679
GP FEs	No	Yes
Model	OLS	OLS
DV Mean	6.448	6.448
DV SD	2.016	2.016

Notes: This table shows GP preferences for LP synthetic characteristics, controlling for whether the respondent is focused on the same investment industry and same investment region displayed in the synthetic partner profile. The specification is $y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \beta \times GovernmentTies_j + \sum_{m=1}^N \gamma_m \times Characteristic_{jm} + \sum_{k=1}^2 \rho_k \times RobustnessCheckTerm_{jk} + \epsilon_{ij}$. The sample includes all GP respondents participating in the experiments who gave at least one valid answer to each question. *GovernmentTies* is a dummy indicating whether the LP profile displays a link to the government. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Table A7. *Same Investment Region* and *Same Investment Industry* indicate whether the synthetic LP has same investment region or investment industry of the GP respondent, respectively. Province-level matching is used when constructing the *Same Region*. 4-digit level industrial classification (or the finest available classification) is used when constructing the *Same Industry*. Partner Rating is on a scale of 1-10. Column 1 shows the basic models. Column 2 shows regressions adding GP respondents fixed effects. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

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TABLE A26. GP Preferences for LPs: Heterogeneity by Government-Owned GPs, Controlling for Having Government Investors

	(1) Gov	(2) Non-Gov	(1)=(2) P-Value	(3) Gov	(4) Non-Gov	(3)=(4) P-Value
Government Ties	0.017 (0.24)	-0.172*** (-3.65)	0.026	0.008 (0.13)	-0.119*** (-2.70)	0.104
Large Investor	0.187*** (2.96)	0.131*** (3.11)	0.460	0.186*** (3.08)	0.157*** (3.94)	0.682
High Registered Capital	0.211*** (3.29)	0.189*** (4.45)	0.773	0.163*** (2.66)	0.194*** (4.85)	0.664
Industry Information	-0.255*** (-4.10)	-0.222*** (-5.33)	0.655	-0.172*** (-2.84)	-0.181*** (-4.59)	0.893
Young LP	0.011 (0.18)	-0.009 (-0.22)	0.788	-0.007 (-0.11)	-0.013 (-0.33)	0.931
Headquarter In Foreign Country	0.029 (0.26)	0.039 (0.52)	0.938	-0.091 (-0.81)	0.011 (0.15)	0.431
Headquarter In Beijing	0.282*** (3.00)	0.175*** (2.84)	0.338	0.226** (2.46)	0.151** (2.54)	0.486
Corporate Governance	0.047 (0.76)	-0.003 (-0.07)	0.505	0.123** (2.05)	0.024 (0.62)	0.160
Investment Philosophy	0.009 (0.14)	0.019 (0.45)	0.891	0.050 (0.80)	0.036 (0.88)	0.852
Stage Focus	-0.081 (-1.29)	-0.081* (-1.93)	0.997	-0.115* (-1.90)	-0.071* (-1.78)	0.531
Observations	4221	9154		4221	9154	
Unique GPs	214	465		214	465	
GP FEs	No	No		Yes	Yes	
Model	OLS	OLS	SUR	OLS	OLS	SUR
Control for Gov Investor	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
DV Mean	6.452	6.445		6.452	6.445	
DV SD	2.038	2.006		2.038	2.006	

Notes: This table compares government GP and nongovernment GP preferences for LP synthetic characteristics, controlling for whether the respondent has had a government investor over the past 3 years. The specification is $y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \beta \times GovernmentTies_j + \sum_{m=1}^N \gamma_m \times Characteristic_{jm} + \rho \times HadGov-LP_j + \epsilon_{ij}$. We run separate regressions for government GPs and nongovernment GPs. Gov-GPs are defined as GPs with government owners. The sample includes all GP respondents participating in the experiments who gave at least one valid answer to each question. *GovernmentTies* is a dummy indicating whether the LP profile displays a link to the government. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Table A7. The dummy *HadGov-LP* indicates whether the GP has received funding from government-owned LPs. Partner Rating and is on a scale of 1-10. Columns 1 and 2 show the basic models for government GPs and nongovernment GPs respectively. Column 3 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 1 and 2 using SUR model. Columns 4 and 5 show regressions with GP respondents fixed effects. Column 6 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 4 and 5 using SUR model. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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TABLE A27. GP Preferences for LPs: Heterogeneity by Gov-LP-linked GPs

	(1)	(2)	(1)=(2)	(3)	(4)	(3)=(4)
	W/Gov Inv	W/out Gov Inv	P-Value	W/Gov Inv	W/out Gov Inv	P-Value
Government Ties	-0.139* (-1.89)	-0.099** (-2.16)	0.646	-0.092 (-1.35)	-0.072* (-1.67)	0.802
Large Investor	0.214*** (3.24)	0.117*** (2.85)	0.213	0.235*** (3.80)	0.135*** (3.44)	0.161
High Registered Capital	0.186*** (2.79)	0.201*** (4.83)	0.850	0.172*** (2.76)	0.191*** (4.81)	0.786
Industry Information	-0.256*** (-3.91)	-0.220*** (-5.41)	0.640	-0.178*** (-2.87)	-0.178*** (-4.56)	0.993
Young LP	-0.070 (-1.07)	0.028 (0.69)	0.203	-0.037 (-0.59)	0.002 (0.06)	0.587
Headquarter In Foreign Country	0.051 (0.46)	0.031 (0.42)	0.884	-0.039 (-0.34)	-0.013 (-0.18)	0.848
Headquarter In Beijing	0.152 (1.53)	0.236*** (3.95)	0.468	0.098 (1.02)	0.211*** (3.64)	0.297
Corporate Governance	-0.057 (-0.87)	0.046 (1.12)	0.182	0.008 (0.13)	0.077** (1.96)	0.328
Investment Philosophy	0.030 (0.44)	0.008 (0.19)	0.782	0.033 (0.51)	0.042 (1.04)	0.892
Stage Focus	-0.115* (-1.74)	-0.070* (-1.69)	0.563	-0.120* (-1.95)	-0.071* (-1.79)	0.482
Observations	4160	9215		4160	9215	
Unique GPs	212	467		212	467	
GP FEs	No	No		Yes	Yes	
Model	OLS	OLS	SUR	OLS	OLS	SUR
DV Mean	6.326	6.502		6.326	6.502	
DV SD	2.120	1.965		2.120	1.965	

Notes: This table shows GP preferences for LP synthetic characteristics, distinguishing between GPs that have had a government investor in the past 3 years and those that have not. The specification is $y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \beta \times GovernmentTies_j + \sum_{m=1}^N \gamma_m \times Characteristic_{jm} + \epsilon_{ij}$. We run separate regressions for GPs that had a government investor in the past 3 years and other GPs. The sample includes all GP respondents participating in the experiments who gave at least one valid answer to each question. *GovernmentTies* is a dummy indicating whether the LP profile displays a link to the government. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Table A7. Partner Rating is on a scale of 1-10. Columns 1 and 2 show the basic models for government-LP-linked GPs and nongovernment-LP-linked GPs respectively. Column 3 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 1 and 2 using SUR model. Columns 4 and 5 show regressions with GP respondents fixed effects. Column 6 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 4 and 5 using SUR model. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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TABLE A28. GP Preferences for LPs: Heterogeneity by Government-Owned GPs, Controlling for Having Central Government Investors

	(1) Gov	(2) Non-Gov	(1)=(2) P-Value	(3) Gov	(4) Non-Gov	(3)=(4) P-Value
Government Ties	-0.010 (-0.09)	-0.277*** (-3.31)	0.054	0.003 (0.03)	-0.195** (-2.56)	0.116
Large Investor	0.235** (2.40)	0.106 (1.41)	0.294	0.235** (2.51)	0.154** (2.23)	0.477
High Registered Capital	0.146 (1.47)	0.163** (2.15)	0.893	0.113 (1.20)	0.180*** (2.61)	0.562
Industry Information	-0.303*** (-3.11)	-0.291*** (-3.93)	0.917	-0.193** (-2.04)	-0.200*** (-2.90)	0.941
Young LP	-0.054 (-0.55)	-0.066 (-0.88)	0.920	-0.070 (-0.75)	-0.039 (-0.57)	0.787
Headquarter In Foreign Country	0.050 (0.29)	0.082 (0.65)	0.880	-0.100 (-0.58)	0.012 (0.10)	0.584
Headquarter In Beijing	0.219 (1.52)	0.083 (0.74)	0.454	0.147 (1.04)	0.122 (1.13)	0.882
Corporate Governance	0.080 (0.82)	-0.066 (-0.89)	0.233	0.157* (1.69)	-0.024 (-0.35)	0.108
Investment Philosophy	0.030 (0.29)	-0.010 (-0.13)	0.757	0.060 (0.63)	-0.002 (-0.02)	0.594
Stage Focus	0.000 (0.00)	-0.139* (-1.86)	0.260	-0.048 (-0.51)	-0.177** (-2.57)	0.258
Observations	1830	3379		1830	3379	
Unique GPs	93	172		93	172	
GP FEs	No	No		Yes	Yes	
Model	OLS	OLS	SUR	OLS	OLS	SUR
Control for Central Gov-LP	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
DV Mean	6.452	6.445		6.452	6.445	
DV SD	2.038	2.006		2.038	2.006	

Notes: This table compares government GP and nongovernment GP preferences for LP synthetic characteristics, controlling for whether the respondent has had a central government investor over the past 3 years. The specification is $y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \beta \times GovernmentTies_j + \sum_{m=1}^N \gamma_m \times Characteristic_{jm} + \rho \times HadGov-LP_j + \epsilon_{ij}$. We run separate regressions for government GPs and nongovernment GPs. Gov-GPs are defined as GPs with government owners. The sample includes all GP respondents participating in the experiments who gave at least one valid answer to each question. *GovernmentTies* is a dummy indicating whether the LP profile displays a link to the government. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Table A7. The dummy *HadGov-LP* indicates whether the GP has received funding from government-owned LPs. Partner Rating and is on a scale of 1-10. Columns 1 and 2 show the basic models for government GPs and nongovernment GPs respectively. Column 3 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 1 and 2 using SUR model. Columns 4 and 5 show regressions with GP respondents fixed effects. Column 6 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 4 and 5 using SUR model. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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TABLE A29. GP Preferences for LPs: Heterogeneity by Government-Owned GPs, Controlling for Having Provincial Government Investors

	(1) Gov	(2) Non-Gov	(1)=(2) P-Value	(3) Gov	(4) Non-Gov	(3)=(4) P-Value
Government Ties	-0.008 (-0.08)	-0.278*** (-3.33)	0.051	0.003 (0.03)	-0.195** (-2.56)	0.116
Large Investor	0.235** (2.39)	0.106 (1.41)	0.296	0.235** (2.51)	0.154** (2.23)	0.477
High Registered Capital	0.146 (1.47)	0.164** (2.16)	0.888	0.113 (1.20)	0.180*** (2.61)	0.562
Industry Information	-0.304*** (-3.11)	-0.291*** (-3.94)	0.915	-0.193** (-2.04)	-0.200*** (-2.90)	0.941
Young LP	-0.055 (-0.56)	-0.068 (-0.90)	0.917	-0.070 (-0.75)	-0.039 (-0.57)	0.787
Headquarter In Foreign Country	0.046 (0.27)	0.084 (0.67)	0.859	-0.100 (-0.58)	0.012 (0.10)	0.584
Headquarter In Beijing	0.215 (1.49)	0.083 (0.73)	0.468	0.147 (1.04)	0.122 (1.13)	0.882
Corporate Governance	0.082 (0.84)	-0.067 (-0.90)	0.223	0.157* (1.69)	-0.024 (-0.35)	0.108
Investment Philosophy	0.029 (0.29)	-0.012 (-0.15)	0.745	0.060 (0.63)	-0.002 (-0.02)	0.594
Stage Focus	0.000 (0.00)	-0.139* (-1.87)	0.257	-0.048 (-0.51)	-0.177** (-2.57)	0.258
Observations	1830	3379		1830	3379	
Unique GPs	93	172		93	172	
GP FEs	No	No		Yes	Yes	
Model	OLS	OLS	SUR	OLS	OLS	SUR
Control for Provincial Gov-LP	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
DV Mean	6.452	6.445		6.452	6.445	
DV SD	2.038	2.006		2.038	2.006	

Notes: This table compares government GP and nongovernment GP preferences for LP synthetic characteristics, controlling for whether the respondent has had a provincial government investor over the past 3 years. The specification is $y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \beta \times GovernmentTies_j + \sum_{m=1}^N \gamma_m \times Characteristic_{jm} + \rho \times HadGov-LP_j + \epsilon_{ij}$. We run separate regressions for government GPs and nongovernment GPs. Gov-GPs are defined as GPs with government owners. The sample includes all GP respondents participating in the experiments who gave at least one valid answer to each question. *GovernmentTies* is a dummy indicating whether the LP profile displays a link to the government. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Table A7. The dummy *HadGov-LP* indicates whether the GP has received funding from government-owned LPs. Partner Rating and is on a scale of 1-10. Columns 1 and 2 show the basic models for government GPs and nongovernment GPs respectively. Column 3 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 1 and 2 using SUR model. Columns 4 and 5 show regressions with GP respondents fixed effects. Column 6 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 4 and 5 using SUR model. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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TABLE A30. GP Preferences for LPs: Heterogeneity by Government-Owned GPs, Controlling for Having Local Government Investors

	(1) Gov	(2) Non-Gov	(1)=(2) P-Value	(3) Gov	(4) Non-Gov	(3)=(4) P-Value
Government Ties	-0.010 (-0.09)	-0.276*** (-3.30)	0.053	0.003 (0.03)	-0.195** (-2.56)	0.116
Large Investor	0.235** (2.40)	0.106 (1.42)	0.297	0.235** (2.51)	0.154** (2.23)	0.477
High Registered Capital	0.148 (1.49)	0.163** (2.15)	0.902	0.113 (1.20)	0.180*** (2.61)	0.562
Industry Information	-0.306*** (-3.13)	-0.290*** (-3.93)	0.900	-0.193** (-2.04)	-0.200*** (-2.90)	0.941
Young LP	-0.051 (-0.53)	-0.066 (-0.88)	0.905	-0.070 (-0.75)	-0.039 (-0.57)	0.787
Headquarter In Foreign Country	0.051 (0.30)	0.083 (0.66)	0.880	-0.100 (-0.58)	0.012 (0.10)	0.584
Headquarter In Beijing	0.222 (1.54)	0.083 (0.74)	0.447	0.147 (1.04)	0.122 (1.13)	0.882
Corporate Governance	0.081 (0.83)	-0.066 (-0.89)	0.228	0.157* (1.69)	-0.024 (-0.35)	0.108
Investment Philosophy	0.029 (0.29)	-0.009 (-0.12)	0.766	0.060 (0.63)	-0.002 (-0.02)	0.594
Stage Focus	-0.001 (-0.01)	-0.139* (-1.86)	0.264	-0.048 (-0.51)	-0.177** (-2.57)	0.258
Observations	1830	3379		1830	3379	
Unique GPs	93	172		93	172	
GP FEs	No	No		Yes	Yes	
Model	OLS	OLS	SUR	OLS	OLS	SUR
Control for Local Gov-LP	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
DV Mean	6.452	6.445		6.452	6.445	
DV SD	2.038	2.006		2.038	2.006	

Notes: This table compares government GP and nongovernment GP preferences for LP synthetic characteristics, controlling for whether the respondent has had a local government investor over the past 3 years. The specification is $y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \beta \times GovernmentTies_j + \sum_{m=1}^N \gamma_m \times Characteristic_{jm} + \rho \times HadGov-LP_j + \epsilon_{ij}$. We run separate regressions for government GPs and nongovernment GPs. Gov-GPs are defined as GPs with government owners. The sample includes all GP respondents participating in the experiments who gave at least one valid answer to each question. *GovernmentTies* is a dummy indicating whether the LP profile displays a link to the government. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Table A7. The dummy *HadGov-LP* indicates whether the GP has received funding from government-owned LPs. Partner Rating and is on a scale of 1-10. Columns 1 and 2 show the basic models for government GPs and nongovernment GPs respectively. Column 3 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 1 and 2 using SUR model. Columns 4 and 5 show regressions with GP respondents fixed effects. Column 6 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 4 and 5 using SUR model. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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TABLE A31. GP Preferences for LPs: Heterogeneity by Central Gov-LP-linked GPs

	(1) W/C_Gov	(2) W/out C_Gov	(1)=(2) P-Value	(3) W/C_Gov	(4) W/out C_Gov	(3)=(4) P-Value
Government Ties	-0.348*** (-2.69)	-0.122 (-1.57)	0.132	-0.239** (-1.99)	-0.088 (-1.24)	0.267
Large Investor	0.164 (1.40)	0.147** (2.12)	0.905	0.172 (1.57)	0.191*** (2.95)	0.882
High Registered Capital	0.246** (2.12)	0.125* (1.77)	0.372	0.194* (1.78)	0.142** (2.19)	0.670
Industry Information	-0.189* (-1.66)	-0.333*** (-4.83)	0.276	-0.112 (-1.05)	-0.229*** (-3.52)	0.339
Young LP	-0.034 (-0.30)	-0.066 (-0.95)	0.811	0.064 (0.59)	-0.088 (-1.35)	0.216
Headquarter In Foreign Country	0.117 (0.57)	0.055 (0.47)	0.791	-0.005 (-0.03)	-0.043 (-0.38)	0.867
Headquarter In Beijing	0.324** (2.00)	0.050 (0.48)	0.155	0.338** (2.13)	0.043 (0.43)	0.107
Corporate Governance	-0.115 (-1.01)	0.027 (0.39)	0.284	0.014 (0.13)	0.049 (0.76)	0.777
Investment Philosophy	-0.097 (-0.84)	0.044 (0.61)	0.300	-0.013 (-0.12)	0.032 (0.48)	0.718
Stage Focus	-0.154 (-1.35)	-0.066 (-0.95)	0.511	-0.095 (-0.88)	-0.146** (-2.27)	0.682
Observations	1403	3806		1403	3806	
Unique GPs	71	194		71	194	
GP FEs	No	No		Yes	Yes	
Model	OLS	OLS	SUR	OLS	OLS	SUR
DV Mean	6.334	6.315		6.334	6.315	
DV SD	2.140	2.142		2.140	2.142	

Notes: This table shows GP preferences for LP synthetic characteristics, distinguishing between GPs that have had a central government investor over the past 3 years and those that have not. The specification is $y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \beta \times GovernmentTies_j + \sum_{m=1}^N \gamma_m \times Characteristic_{jm} + \epsilon_{ij}$. We run separate regressions for GPs that have had a central government investor over the past 3 years and those that have not. The sample includes all GP respondents participating in the experiments who gave at least one valid answer to each question. *GovernmentTies* is a dummy indicating whether the LP profile displays a link to the government. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Table A7. The dummy *HadGov-LP* indicates whether the GP has received funding from government-owned LPs. Partner Rating and is on a scale of 1-10. Columns 1 and 2 show the basic models for government GPs and nongovernment GPs respectively. Column 3 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 1 and 2 using SUR model. Columns 4 and 5 show regressions with GP respondents fixed effects. Column 6 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 4 and 5 using SUR model. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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TABLE A32. GP Preferences for LPs: Heterogeneity by Provincial Gov-LP-linked GPs

	(1)	(2)	(1)=(2)	(3)	(4)	(3)=(4)
	W/P_Gov	W/out P_Gov	P-Value	W/P_Gov	W/out P_Gov	P-Value
Government Ties	-0.103 (-0.67)	-0.206*** (-2.81)	0.545	-0.169 (-1.24)	-0.123* (-1.79)	0.751
Large Investor	0.322** (2.31)	0.112* (1.69)	0.171	0.352*** (2.81)	0.148** (2.39)	0.132
High Registered Capital	0.287** (2.07)	0.127* (1.89)	0.297	0.303** (2.45)	0.121* (1.94)	0.176
Industry Information	-0.360*** (-2.64)	-0.283*** (-4.33)	0.609	-0.378*** (-3.06)	-0.159** (-2.55)	0.102
Young LP	-0.154 (-1.10)	-0.033 (-0.50)	0.431	-0.131 (-1.04)	-0.021 (-0.34)	0.420
Headquarter In Foreign Country	0.303 (1.28)	0.019 (0.17)	0.277	0.053 (0.23)	-0.047 (-0.43)	0.688
Headquarter In Beijing	0.460** (2.19)	0.052 (0.53)	0.076	0.383* (1.91)	0.070 (0.74)	0.147
Corporate Governance	-0.156 (-1.14)	0.018 (0.28)	0.247	-0.133 (-1.09)	0.074 (1.21)	0.119
Investment Philosophy	-0.094 (-0.68)	0.028 (0.42)	0.427	-0.047 (-0.37)	0.038 (0.60)	0.536
Stage Focus	-0.129 (-0.94)	-0.083 (-1.26)	0.760	-0.208* (-1.68)	-0.115* (-1.85)	0.489
Observations	977	4232		977	4232	
Unique GPs	50	215		50	215	
GP FEs	No	No		Yes	Yes	
Model	OLS	OLS	SUR	OLS	OLS	SUR
DV Mean	6.254	6.336		6.254	6.336	
DV SD	2.150	2.139		2.150	2.139	

Notes: This table shows GP preferences for LP synthetic characteristics, distinguishing between GPs that have had a provincial government investor over the past 3 years and those that have not. The specification is $y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \beta \times GovernmentTies_j + \sum_{m=1}^N \gamma_m \times Characteristic_{jm} + \epsilon_{ij}$. We run separate regressions for GPs that have had a provincial government investor over the past 3 years and those that have not. The sample includes all GP respondents participating in the experiments who gave at least one valid answer to each question. *GovernmentTies* is a dummy indicating whether the LP profile displays a link to the government. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Table A7. The dummy *HadGov-LP* indicates whether the GP has received funding from government-owned LPs. Partner Rating and is on a scale of 1-10. Columns 1 and 2 show the basic models for government GPs and nongovernment GPs respectively. Column 3 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 1 and 2 using SUR model. Columns 4 and 5 show regressions with GP respondents fixed effects. Column 6 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 4 and 5 using SUR model. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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TABLE A33. GP Preferences for LPs: Heterogeneity by Local Gov-LP-linked GPs

	(1) W/L_Gov	(2) W/out L_Gov	(1)=(2) P-Value	(3) W/L_Gov	(4) W/out L_Gov	(3)=(4) P-Value
Government Ties	-0.138 (-1.49)	-0.220** (-2.29)	0.537	-0.093 (-1.08)	-0.153* (-1.75)	0.618
Large Investor	0.170** (2.07)	0.124 (1.43)	0.701	0.224*** (2.92)	0.134* (1.66)	0.403
High Registered Capital	0.182** (2.17)	0.146* (1.67)	0.768	0.221*** (2.85)	0.105 (1.30)	0.285
Industry Information	-0.230*** (-2.81)	-0.379*** (-4.44)	0.206	-0.145* (-1.87)	-0.264*** (-3.29)	0.273
Young LP	-0.067 (-0.81)	-0.048 (-0.56)	0.878	-0.046 (-0.59)	-0.036 (-0.46)	0.932
Headquarter In Foreign Country	-0.047 (-0.34)	0.205 (1.37)	0.212	-0.111 (-0.79)	0.056 (0.40)	0.389
Headquarter In Beijing	-0.063 (-0.51)	0.344*** (2.72)	0.021	-0.113 (-0.95)	0.391*** (3.18)	0.002
Corporate Governance	0.016 (0.19)	-0.050 (-0.58)	0.578	0.034 (0.44)	0.032 (0.41)	0.989
Investment Philosophy	0.084 (0.98)	-0.079 (-0.90)	0.183	0.018 (0.23)	0.024 (0.30)	0.957
Stage Focus	-0.092 (-1.11)	-0.083 (-0.97)	0.941	-0.103 (-1.34)	-0.162** (-2.02)	0.587
Observations	2665	2544		2665	2544	
Unique GPs	136	129		136	129	
GP FEs	No	No		Yes	Yes	
Model	OLS	OLS	SUR	OLS	OLS	SUR
DV Mean	6.333	6.307		6.333	6.307	
DV SD	2.117	2.167		2.117	2.167	

Notes: This table shows GP preferences for LP synthetic characteristics, distinguishing between GPs that have had a local government investor over the past 3 years and those that have not. The specification is $y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \beta \times GovernmentTies_j + \sum_{m=1}^N \gamma_m \times Characteristic_{jm} + \epsilon_{ij}$. We run separate regressions for GPs that have had a local government investor over the past 3 years and those that have not. The sample includes all GP respondents participating in the experiments who gave at least one valid answer to each question. *GovernmentTies* is a dummy indicating whether the LP profile displays a link to the government. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Table A7. The dummy *HadGov-LP* indicates whether the GP has received funding from government-owned LPs. Partner Rating and is on a scale of 1-10. Columns 1 and 2 show the basic models for government GPs and nongovernment GPs respectively. Column 3 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 1 and 2 using SUR model. Columns 4 and 5 show regressions with GP respondents fixed effects. Column 6 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 4 and 5 using SUR model. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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TABLE A34. Government Experience of Individual Respondents

	Gov Owned	NonGov Owned	Total
Gov Tied	107	139	246
NonGov Tied	109	333	442
Total	216	472	688

Notes: This table presents the relationship of government ties and government ownership for GP respondents. We have 688 GP respondents. Gov-GPs are defined as GPs that have at least one ultimate government owner, as described in the paper. Government Tied GPs are defined as GPs that its identified individual respondent worked for either a government bureau, an SOE, or a government-owned VCPE entity before their current (i.e., at the time of the survey) job.

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TABLE A35. GP Preferences for LPs: Heterogeneity by Individual Respondents with Government Experience

	(1) GovTied	(2) Non-GovTied	(1)=(2) P-Value	(3) GovTied	(4) Non-GovTied	(3)=(4) P-Value
Government Ties	-0.130** (-1.99)	-0.106** (-2.19)	0.771	-0.076 (-1.22)	-0.080* (-1.77)	0.961
Large Investor	0.188*** (3.19)	0.125*** (2.87)	0.390	0.202*** (3.60)	0.147*** (3.56)	0.420
High Registered Capital	0.204*** (3.44)	0.190*** (4.30)	0.848	0.201*** (3.52)	0.176*** (4.23)	0.718
Industry Information	-0.244*** (-4.18)	-0.223*** (-5.18)	0.773	-0.207*** (-3.68)	-0.162*** (-3.96)	0.508
Young LP	-0.013 (-0.22)	0.001 (0.03)	0.842	0.011 (0.20)	-0.021 (-0.51)	0.634
Headquarter In Foreign Country	-0.035 (-0.34)	0.068 (0.88)	0.421	-0.073 (-0.71)	0.005 (0.06)	0.535
Headquarter In Beijing	0.208** (2.43)	0.208*** (3.21)	0.996	0.186** (2.21)	0.169*** (2.72)	0.873
Corporate Governance	0.038 (0.65)	-0.001 (-0.02)	0.590	0.059 (1.05)	0.054 (1.31)	0.947
Investment Philosophy	-0.020 (-0.33)	0.034 (0.76)	0.469	-0.002 (-0.04)	0.063 (1.47)	0.352
Stage Focus	-0.132** (-2.23)	-0.061 (-1.41)	0.339	-0.131** (-2.32)	-0.062 (-1.50)	0.315
Observations	4735	8640		4735	8640	
Unique GPs	242	437		242	437	
GP FEs	No	No		Yes	Yes	
Model	OLS	OLS	SUR	OLS	OLS	SUR
DV Mean	6.454	6.444		6.454	6.444	
DV SD	2.016	2.016		2.016	2.016	

Notes: This table compares the GP preferences for LP characteristics, distinguishing between GP individual respondents that have prior government experience and those that have not. The specification is $y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \beta \times GovernmentTies_j + \sum_{m=1}^N \gamma_m \times Characteristic_{jm} + \epsilon_{ij}$. *GovernmentTies* is a dummy indicating whether the LP profile displays a link to the government. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Table A7. Partner Rating is on a scale of 1-10. Column 1 and 2 show the basic models for respondents with and without gov-ties respectively. Column 3 shows the difference in coefficients columns 1 and 2 using SUR model. Columns 4 and 5 show regressions with GP respondents fixed effects. Column 6 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 4 and 5 using SUR model. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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TABLE A36. GP Preferences for LPs: Heterogeneity by Government-Owned GPs, Controlling for Individual Respondents having Government Experience

	(1) Gov	(2) Non-Gov	(1)=(2) P-Value	(3) Gov	(4) Non-Gov	(3)=(4) P-Value
Government Ties	0.014 (0.20)	-0.171*** (-3.64)	0.028	0.008 (0.13)	-0.119*** (-2.70)	0.104
Large Investor	0.186*** (2.96)	0.131*** (3.12)	0.467	0.186*** (3.08)	0.157*** (3.94)	0.682
High Registered Capital	0.210*** (3.27)	0.187*** (4.41)	0.774	0.163*** (2.66)	0.194*** (4.85)	0.664
Industry Information	-0.257*** (-4.13)	-0.223*** (-5.35)	0.648	-0.172*** (-2.84)	-0.181*** (-4.59)	0.893
Young LP	0.008 (0.13)	-0.012 (-0.29)	0.786	-0.007 (-0.11)	-0.013 (-0.33)	0.931
Headquarter In Foreign Country	0.027 (0.24)	0.040 (0.53)	0.922	-0.091 (-0.81)	0.011 (0.15)	0.431
Headquarter In Beijing	0.279*** (2.96)	0.177*** (2.87)	0.365	0.226** (2.46)	0.151** (2.54)	0.486
Corporate Governance	0.048 (0.77)	-0.002 (-0.04)	0.508	0.123** (2.05)	0.024 (0.62)	0.160
Investment Philosophy	0.011 (0.17)	0.019 (0.44)	0.913	0.050 (0.80)	0.036 (0.88)	0.852
Stage Focus	-0.081 (-1.29)	-0.084** (-1.99)	0.973	-0.115* (-1.90)	-0.071* (-1.78)	0.531
Observations	4221	9154		4221	9154	
Unique GPs	214	465		214	465	
GP FEs	No	No		Yes	Yes	
Model	OLS	OLS	SUR	OLS	OLS	SUR
Control for Gov Tie	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	
DV Mean	6.452	6.445		6.452	6.445	
DV SD	2.038	2.006		2.038	2.006	

Notes: This table compares government GP and nongovernment GP preferences for LP characteristics after controlling for whether the individual respondent has prior government experience (as discussed in this paper). The specification is $y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \beta \times GovernmentTies_j + \sum_{m=1}^N \gamma_m \times Characteristic_{jm} + \epsilon_{ij}$. We run separate regressions for government GPs and nongovernment GPs. Gov-GPs are defined as GPs with government owners. *GovernmentTies* is a dummy indicating whether the LP profile displays a link to the government. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Table A7. Partner Rating is on a scale of 1-10. Column 1 and 2 show the basic models for government GPs and nongovernment GPs, respectively. Column 3 shows the difference in coefficients columns 1 and 2 using SUR model. Columns 4 and 5 show regressions with GP respondent fixed effects. Column 6 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 4 and 5 using SUR model. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

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TABLE A37. 2021 Qualitative Survey: Selection of Respondents

	New Survey Respondents (N=361)	All Respondents (N=688)	P-value
Share Government-Owned (%)	32.20	32.05	0.960
AUM (\$ millions)	1252.61	1001.76	0.065*
IRR (% median)	37.43	32.34	0.342
Funds	3.54	3.32	0.457
Investments	62.06	48.40	0.027**
Exits	11.05	9.36	0.159

Notes: This table summarizes the selection of GP respondents in 2021 qualitative survey, using Zero2IPO administrative data for the period 2015–19. We have 361 survey respondents, out of 688 2019 survey respondents. The column of *P-value* reports the p-values of the t-tests for each variable. *Share Government-Owned (%)* is the share of entities that are government-owned, *AUM (\$ millions)* is the assets under management (in Million USD), *IRR (% median)* is the median internal rate of return, *Funds* is the number of funds managed by the GP, *Investments* is the number of investments made by the GP, *Exits* is the number of exit events for the GP investments. *AUM (\$ millions)* and *IRR (% median)* are winsorized at the top 95%. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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TABLE A38. Text Analysis of Open-Ended Questions Regarding Government Investors

Mechanism	Research Assistant 1	Research Assistant 2
Investment Interference	74.80%	73.23%
No Risk Tolerance	1.57%	1.57%
Short Investment Horizon	2.36%	3.94%
Lack of Professional Team	7.88%	6.30%
Exposure to Policy Uncertainty	2.36%	2.36%
Other	11.03%	12.60%
Total	100%	100%

Notes: This table reports the analysis of the text contained in the responses by GPs to an open-ended question Zero2IPO asked in a 2019 survey regarding potential suggestions to make government LPs more attractive. We ask two research assistants to independently assign each response to one of the Cons we listed in our 2021 survey or to a Other category. The table reports the percentage of answers belonging to each group, focusing on 127 valid responses.

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TABLE A39. Experimental Dislike for Government LPs and Stated Mechanisms

Mechanisms	All	Gov GP	Non-gov GP
Adv 1. Regulatory Approvals and Tax Reductions	0.17	0.20	0.16
Adv 2. Reduce Fundraising Pressure	0.07	0.75	-0.08
Adv 3. Access to Information	0.28	0.66	0.19
Adv 4. Obtain Local Government Support	-0.17	0.00	-0.23
Adv 5. Attract Potential Investors	0.14	0.78	0.00
Disadv 1. Investment Interference	-0.20	0.06	-0.24
Disadv 2. No Risk Tolerance	0.14	0.37	0.00
Disadv 3. Short Investment Horizon	-0.17	-0.20	-0.13
Disadv 4. Lack of Professional Team	0.04	0.71	-0.18
Disadv 5. Exposure to Policy Uncertainty	0.00	0.15	-0.13

Notes: This table reports the median of the coefficients on *GovernmentTies* obtained in our experimental surveys of GPs, grouping GPs based on the stated primary Advantages and Disadvantages of government investors (as reported in the 2021 qualitative surveys). A coefficient on *GovernmentTies* for each GP is obtained by running the baseline specification once for each of the 361 GPs who also responded to our 2021 surveys. Column 2 reports the median coefficients for all respondent GPs; Column 3 reports the median coefficients for government GPs; Column 4 reports the median coefficients for nongovernment GPs.

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TABLE A40. Summary Statistics (Government-owned if Ownership \geq 20%)

	Active			Respondent		
	All	Gov	NonGov	All	Gov	NonGov
Panel A: LPs						
Share Government-Owned (%)	35.10	100.00	0.00	66.12	100.00	0.00
Capital Invested (\$ millions)	50.36	123.64	22.05	399.59	516.44	215.25
Funds Invested	1.98	2.77	1.55	9.24	10.76	5.14
Panel B: GPs						
Share Government-Owned (%)	22.92	100.00	0.00	16.47	100.00	0.00
AUM (\$ millions)	741.30	1014.01	645.04	1001.76	1729.76	844.13
IRR (% median)	27.64	19.52	30.55	32.34	24.27	36.49
Funds	2.54	2.86	2.42	3.32	4.28	3.09
Investments	13.42	10.41	14.27	48.40	36.14	50.81
Exits	5.91	5.47	6.04	9.36	10.07	9.21

Notes: This table reports summary statistics for both LPs and GPs where government-owned entities are defined as entities with a government ownership greater than 20%, using Zero2IPO administrative data for the period 2015–19. We have 7,974 active LPs of which 312 LPs are respondents, and 6,308 active GPs of which 688 GPs are respondents. We exclude foreign entities from this analysis. The Panel A includes variables for LPs. The Panel B includes variables for GPs. *Share Government-Owned (%)* is the share of entities that are government-owned, *Capital Invested* is the amount of capital the LP invested in funds (in Million USD), *Funds Invested* is the number of funds the LP invested in, *AUM (\$ millions)* are the assets under management (in Million USD), *IRR (% median)* is the median internal rate of return, *Funds* is the number of funds managed by the GP, *Investments* is the number of investments made by the GP, *Exits* is the number of exit events for the GP investments. *Capital Invested (\$ millions)*, *AUM (\$ millions)* and *IRR (% median)* are winsorized at the top 95%.

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TABLE A41. Government-Owned GPs Perform Worse (Government-owned if Ownership $\geq 20\%$)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	CR	CR	CR	CR	IRR	IRR	IRR	IRR
Gov GPs	-0.009*** (-2.99)	-0.004 (-1.46)	-0.009** (-2.12)	-0.003 (-0.76)	-15.411*** (-3.37)	-12.387*** (-2.66)	-19.366*** (-3.85)	-15.794*** (-3.03)
AUM			0.000* (1.83)	-0.000 (-0.22)			-0.001 (-1.06)	-0.002 (-1.62)
Observations	1104	1104	683	683	984	984	631	631
HQ FEs	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: This table illustrates the association between GPs' government ownership status and GP performance where government-owned entities are defined as entities with a government ownership greater than 20%. The specification is $y_j = \alpha_i + \beta \times GovGPs_j + \gamma \times AUM_j + \epsilon_{ij}$. The sample includes all active GPs with non-missing data for CR (columns 1-4) and IRR (columns 5-8). *GovGPs* is a dummy indicating whether a GP is government owned. CR is comprehensive return, which is standardized to 0-1. IRR is winsorized at the 95% percentile. *AUM* is the total asset under management in USD millions, and is winsorized at the 95% percentile. Columns 1 and 5 show the basic models. Columns 2 and 6 show the results with headquarters FEs. Columns 3 and 7 show the results with *AUM* as controls. Columns 4 and 8 show the results with both headquarters FEs and *AUM* controls. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE A42. Assortative Matching Between Government-Owned GPs and LPs (Government-owned if Ownership $\geq 20\%$)

	Gov LP	Non-Gov LP	ColRatio
Gov GP	2.128 (20.25 %)	0.575 (10.20 %)	3.699 (0.000)
Non-Gov GP	0.897 (22.80 %)	0.988 (46.75 %)	0.908 (0.000)
RowRatio	2.372 (0.000)	0.583 (0.000)	
Assortative Index		1.178	
Homogeneity Test(p-value)		0.000	

Notes: This table presents the distribution of links between different GPs and LPs grouped by government ownership where government-owned entities are defined as entities with a government ownership greater than 20%, illustrating assortative matching patterns. The likelihood ratio index is calculated as $s(p^{GP}, p^{LP}) = \frac{Pr(G^{GP}=p^{GP}, G^{LP}=p^{LP})}{Pr(G^{GP}=p^{GP})Pr(G^{LP}=p^{LP})}$. We define $Pr(G^{GP} = p)$ as the ratio of type p GP among all GPs with at least one link, e.g., if p is government owned, then the probability is the ratio of government owned GPs among GPs with at least one link. $Pr(G^{GP} = G^{LP} = p)$ is defined as the ratio of links where GP and LP both belong to group p among all links in the sample. The number in the parentheses is the fraction of links among all links formed between GP and LP with ownership information. Assortative index is calculated as the weighted average of the diagonal elements. ColRatio is calculated as column 1 divided by column 2 in the same row. RowRatio is calculated as row 1 divided by row 2 in the same column. The numbers in the parentheses under the ColRatios and RowRatios are the p-values of the binomial test within the corresponding rows and columns respectively, under the null hypothesis of random matching. The p-value of the homogeneity test is a Chi-square test.

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TABLE A43. GP Preferences for LPs: Heterogeneity by Government-Owned GPs (Government-owned if Ownership \geq 20%)

	(1) Gov	(2) Non-Gov	(1)=(2) P-Value	(3) Gov	(4) Non-Gov	(3)=(4) P-Value
Government Ties	0.031 (0.31)	-0.140*** (-3.29)	0.113	0.039 (0.40)	-0.100** (-2.51)	0.171
Large Investor	0.227*** (2.59)	0.131*** (3.43)	0.314	0.188** (2.21)	0.162*** (4.48)	0.778
High Registered Capital	0.173* (1.96)	0.199*** (5.14)	0.790	0.149* (1.73)	0.190*** (5.23)	0.653
Industry Information	-0.344*** (-3.97)	-0.211*** (-5.58)	0.157	-0.271*** (-3.17)	-0.162*** (-4.52)	0.231
Young LP	-0.049 (-0.56)	0.006 (0.15)	0.563	-0.082 (-0.97)	0.006 (0.16)	0.328
Headquarter In Foreign Country	0.313** (2.16)	-0.020 (-0.29)	0.037	0.259* (1.76)	-0.079 (-1.16)	0.032
Headquarter In Beijing	0.368*** (2.90)	0.178*** (3.16)	0.171	0.344*** (2.76)	0.141*** (2.59)	0.124
Corporate Governance	0.030 (0.34)	0.009 (0.24)	0.829	0.093 (1.10)	0.048 (1.34)	0.615
Investment Philosophy	0.127 (1.43)	-0.007 (-0.18)	0.167	0.134 (1.54)	0.021 (0.57)	0.221
Stage Focus	-0.052 (-0.60)	-0.090** (-2.36)	0.690	-0.111 (-1.28)	-0.080** (-2.22)	0.730
Observations	2206	11169		2206	11169	
Unique GPs	111	568		111	568	
GP FEs	No	No		Yes	Yes	
Model	OLS	OLS	SUR	OLS	OLS	SUR
DV Mean	6.434	6.450		6.434	6.450	
DV SD	2.050	2.009		2.050	2.009	

Notes: This table compares government GP and nongovernment GP preferences for LP synthetic characteristics, where government-owned entities are defined as entities with a government ownership share of greater than 20%. The specification is $y_{ij} = \alpha_i + \beta \times GovernmentTies_j + \sum_{m=1}^N \gamma_m \times Characteristic_{jm} + \epsilon_{ij}$. We run separate regressions for government GPs and nongovernment GPs. The sample includes all GP respondents participating in the experiments who gave at least one valid answer to each question. *GovernmentTies* is a dummy indicating whether the LP profile displays a link to the government. Details of the remaining characteristics are illustrated in Table A7. Partner Rating is on a scale of 1-10. Columns 1 and 2 show the basic models for government GPs and nongovernment GPs respectively. Column 3 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 1 and 2 using SUR model. Columns 4 and 5 show regressions with GP respondents fixed effects. Column 6 shows the difference in coefficients in columns 4 and 5 using SUR model. *t* statistics are presented in parentheses. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

APPENDIX A.2. A SIMPLE MODEL OF GP-LP MATCHING

Setup. We model the formation of GP-LP partnerships as a two-sided search and matching process in continuous time. There are discrete I types of GPs and J types of LPs each searching for one potential partner.³⁶ If GP of type i and LP of type j form a partnership, then the GP obtains value $x_{ij} + \epsilon$ and the LP obtains value $y_{ij} + \delta$, where x_{ij} and y_{ij} are type-specific values from the partnership, and ϵ, δ are match-specific idiosyncratic values drawn independently from the standard Gumbel distribution. Meetings arise randomly following a Poisson process. A meeting involves a type- i GP and type- j LP with probability m_{ij} . $\{\sum_j m_{ij}\}_i$ is the marginal distribution of GP types and $\{\sum_i m_{ij}\}_j$ the marginal distribution of LP types. Both parties decide whether to form a partnership—the LP decides whether to invest in the GP and the GP decides whether to accept the investment. If either prefers not to match, both parties go back to search. Let u_i and v_j denote the value functions of unmatched GPs and LPs, respectively, characterized by:

$$(A1) \quad ru_i = \rho^G \sum_{j=1}^J \frac{m_{ij}q_{ij}}{\sum_j m_{ij}} \mathbb{E}[\max(\epsilon_0, x_{ij} - u_i + \epsilon)], \quad rv_j = \rho^L \sum_{i=1}^I \frac{m_{ij}p_{ij}}{\sum_i m_{ij}} \mathbb{E}[\max(\delta_0, y_{ij} - v_j + \delta)]$$

where ρ^G and ρ^L are the Poisson rates at which a GP and an LP meet a potential partner, respectively.³⁷ To interpret the HJB equations, consider the flow value ru_i of an unmatched type- i GP with discount rate r . At rate ρ^G , the GP meets an LP with type drawn from the conditional distribution $\left\{ \frac{m_{ij}}{\sum_j m_{ij}} \right\}$. Both parties evaluate each other and decide whether to match. The GP's continuation value is $x_{ij} + \epsilon$ from matching and $u_i + \epsilon_0$ from continuing to search, where ϵ_0 is the idiosyncratic change in continuation value upon rejecting the potential partner.³⁸ A partnership is formed only if both parties prefer the match over continuing to search. A type- j LP prefers the match with probability $q_{ij} = \mathbb{E}[v_j + \delta_0 \geq y_{ij} + \delta]$, in which case the GP's expected change in value is thus $\mathbb{E}[\max(\epsilon_0, x_{ij} - u_i + \epsilon)]$. Otherwise, the rejected GP has an expected value change of zero. The standard Gumbel distribution of the idiosyncratic values (ϵ 's and δ 's) imply

$$(A2) \quad p_{ij} = \frac{e^{u_i}}{e^{u_i} + e^{x_{ij}}}, \quad q_{ij} = \frac{e^{v_j}}{e^{v_j} + e^{y_{ij}}}$$

We take as model primitives the type-specific values from partnerships (x_{ij} and y_{ij}), the matching rate relative to the discount rate ($\{\rho^G/r, \rho^L/r\}$), and the type distribution from which meetings are drawn ($\{m_{ij}\}$).³⁹ Given these primitives, the probabilities of preferring to match (p_{ij} and q_{ij}) follow (A2), and the equilibrium value of unmatched entities (u_i and v_j) are the endogenous fixed point solutions to the HJB equations (A1). We later consider counterfactual changes to the model primitives as we conduct policy experiments.

Parameterization. We leverage both our experimental surveys and the administrative data to parameterize the model. Motivated by our reduced-form evidence, we categorize GPs into $I=4$

³⁶While the matching between GPs and LPs can be many-to-many, we assume that each GP has a discrete number of investment slots to be funded, that each LP has the capacity to invest in multiple slots, and that the matching between GPs and LPs at the investment slot-to-capacity level is one-to-one.

³⁷We allow ρ^G and ρ^L to differ, reflecting differences in market thickness on both sides.

³⁸The idiosyncratic change in value could reflect the information that the GP gathers from the meeting about its own investment prospects or about the market more broadly.

³⁹We study a stationary equilibrium where a constant stream of new entities enter the search market to replace those that are matched, such that the total distribution of participant types are time-invariant.

types, according to their government ownership {gov, non-gov} and quality {high, low}, with quality types defined by having comprehensive returns above and below the median. We categorize LPs into $J=2$ types according to government ownership. We exploit the two main questions in our experimental survey. We interpret the average GP and LP response for question [1] (“*Are you interested in establishing an investment relationship with this investment partner?*”) as the value of matches (x_{ij} and y_{ij}) between the respective types.⁴⁰ For question [2] (“*How likely do you think it is that this investment partner would want to enter an investment relationship with your organization?*”), we interpret the average GP response across each type-pairs as $\alpha + \beta \ln \frac{q_{ij}}{1-q_{ij}}$, where the logit transformation maps the survey response into probabilities given parameters α and β , and that the LP responses are symmetrically informative of p_{ij} . We calibrate parameters α , β , ρ^G/r and ρ^L/r . α and β translate survey responses to cooperation interests $\{p_{ij}, q_{ij}\}$, which map into the value of unmatched entities $\{u_i, v_j\}$ through equations (A2) and, along with the observed distribution of matches from the administrative data, also pin down the type distribution of meetings m_{ij} .⁴¹ The value of unmatched entities $\{u_i, v_j\}$ must satisfy the HJB equations (A1). We thus have $I + J = 6$ equations and four parameters, which are chosen to minimize the sum of squared errors in the equations.

Counterfactuals. Our first set of counterfactuals consider the equilibrium effect of channeling government capital towards nongovernment or well-performing GPs, reported in Panel A of Table A44. Column (1) reports the scenario where government GPs and government LPs are 20% less likely to meet (i.e., 20% of their meetings are replaced by drawing a new pair). The table shows that government-owned GPs and LPs experience surplus declines and nongovernment-owned entities experience minor gains. In terms of magnitudes, government-owned GPs experience a decline in surplus of -0.18 Likert points. Extrapolating the coefficients in Table 5, this is equivalent to reducing the capital allocated by their investors by over \$10 million. Despite the losses in surplus, government LPs do invest in marginally better-performing GPs with slightly higher IRR. In column (2) of Table A44, Panel A, we consider a similar experiment where we channel government LPs to invest in GPs with above-median returns (specifically, government LPs and low-quality GPs are 20% less likely to meet). The policy raises the IRR of GPs receiving investment from government LPs (by 1.86 percentage points). The increase in the average IRR of all funded GPs is lower (0.89 percentage points), as low-quality GPs substitute towards investments from nongovernment LPs. Despite the increase in average returns, the equilibrium value of GPs again decreases on average. Overall, through the lens of these results in Panel A, the empirical regularity that government LPs tend to invest in low-performing government GPs does not necessarily reflect capital misallocation; instead, it might be at least in part driven by the preferences of the top-performing GPs for private capital, which makes it challenging for government investors to match with the best firms in the first place. Our second set of counterfactuals evaluate the effects of alternative value divisions. Column (1) of Table A44, Panel B shows the equilibrium impact of nongovernment GPs obtaining the same value x_{ij} as government GPs when matched with government LPs, while holding $x_{ij} + y_{ij}$ constant. In equilibrium, the surplus of nongovernment GPs increases, as they obtain more value when matched

⁴⁰We partial out observable characteristics besides government connection and quality from the responses.

⁴¹The observed distribution of type-pairs that form matches must be proportional to $m_{ij}p_{ij}q_{ij}$.

with government LPs. Perhaps surprisingly, the surplus of government GPs also increases. This is an equilibrium effect: as nongovernment GPs capture more value *vis-à-vis* government LP investors, they become less likely to form matches with government LPs, which in turn become less selective in equilibrium and accept more potential matches, thereby raising the surplus of all GPs. Column (2) of Table A44, Panel B considers the related counterfactual where government LPs obtain the same value y_{ij} as nongovernment LPs when matched with nongovernment GPs (again holding $x_{ij} + y_{ij}$ constant). The direct effect of this counterfactual is to leave more value to the GPs, thereby raising their surplus. In equilibrium, GPs become more selective, leading to a reduction in the surplus of all LPs, including nongovernment ones whose match value y_{ij} is not directly affected.

TABLE A44. Counterfactuals

Panel A: Channeling government capital to private or well-performing GPs		
	gov LP and gov GP are 20% less likely to meet (1)	gov LP and low quality GP 20% less likely to meet (2)
Impact on GP's surplus (Likert scale)		
Gov GP with high quality	-0.18	0.13
Gov GP with low quality	-0.18	-0.19
Non-gov GP with high quality	0.12	0.11
Non-gov GP with low quality	0.12	-0.087
Impact on LP's surplus (Likert scale)		
Gov LP	-0.090	-0.078
Non-gov LP	0.10	0.098
Changes in the IRR of GPs that LPs invest in (percentage points)		
Gov LP	-0.046	1.86
Non-gov LP	-0.072	-0.30
Average	-0.024	0.89
Panel B: Counterfactual divisions of value		
	non-gov GPs obtain the same value (x_{ij}) as gov GPs (1)	gov LPs obtain the same value (y_{ij}) as non-gov LPs (2)
Impact on GP's surplus (Likert scale)		
Gov, High Quality	0.0032	0.024
Gov, Low Quality	0.0047	0.035
Non-gov, High Quality	0.060	0.26
Non-gov, Low Quality	0.0078	0.15
Impact on LP's surplus (Likert scale)		
Gov	-0.024	-0.19
Non-gov	-0.0044	-0.027

Notes: This table reports counterfactuals based on the model. Panel A considers scenarios that government LPs are less likely to meet with government GPs (column 1) or worse-performing GPs (column 2). Panel B considers counterfactual divisions of value, such as when nongovernment GPs obtain the same value as government LPs when matched with nongovernment LPs (column 1) and when government LPs obtain the same value as nongovernment LPs when matched with nongovernment GPs (column 2). Surplus changes are reported in Likert scale, consistent with our experimental design.